

5. Speculation at this stage is particularly risky; but it is not (repeat not) our view that the attack on Korea is likely to herald a new series of outbreaks. In all probability there will not be a chain reaction. Our tentative view is that the Communists decided to strike in South Korea in order to gather up one of the few remaining fragments in Asia now outside their control before the Military Defence Assistance Programme of the United States could become fully effective in the Far East and before a new and vigorous United States policy in that area had become crystallized. At the moment, however, it is impossible to rule out entirely the contingency that even the most far-reaching and catastrophic events may be precipitated.

6. In any case, even if the war in Korea can be localized, this act of aggression is bound to lead to further deterioration in the relations between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, especially since, for the first time, the Communists have chosen to try to achieve their ends by bare-faced, old-fashioned military invasion. It may be argued that the fighting now taking place is really a form of civil war, since the bulk of the combatants on both sides are undoubtedly Koreans. But this argument can hardly stand up against the contention that the Republic of Korea is an independent State with a government created by action of the United Nations.

7. The consequences for the United Nations itself are also bound to be serious. The ten proposals made by Mr. Lie now have a somewhat academic air.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, countries contemplating recognition of the Peoples Government in Peking will inevitably find such action more difficult in the present changed climate of opinion; and there will therefore be less hope of success for efforts to regularize the situation within the United Nations by seating a representative of the Peoples Government in Peking. If at the meeting of the Security Council on Sunday, the Soviet Union and the Peking Government had been represented, they would have been able to use delaying tactics and ultimately to veto the resolution. On the other hand, their presence would have made it easier to press home the charges against those responsible for the aggression and to force them to answer for their complicity.

8. It will probably be argued by Soviet apologists that the resolution passed by the Security Council on the 25th of June is illegal because it was not passed with the concurring votes of all the permanent members. In rebuttal, it could be urged that the practice by which an abstention of one of the permanent members has been construed to be equivalent to assent could be extended to cover as well the absence of a permanent member. These legal disputes, however, are perhaps immaterial when set beside the plain fact that the United States has secured a condemnation of this Communist attack by all those members of the Security Council which were present (with the single exception of Yugoslavia, which abstained) and has thus obtained strong moral support for whatever military measures it feels able to take in Korea. Ends.

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<sup>6</sup> Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Le Canada et les Nations Unies 1950*, Ottawa, Imprimeur du Roi, 1951, p. 46.

See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canada and the United Nations 1950*, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951, p. 46.