

Such a course would have violated the Atlantic Charter in spirit if not in letter; would have been at best unsupported by the United States; and would have aroused the antagonism or suspicion of small states and national groups.

The omission of all direct reference to territorial commitments must be regarded not only as a success for United Kingdom diplomacy but as promising a greater degree of agreement amongst the United Nations.

*Security* — Both the United Kingdom and the United States have long accepted in principle the need of the U.S.S.R. for security against aggression after the war. The proper means to that end were, however, in dispute. On the one hand, the Russians asked for strategic frontiers; and, on the other, the United States proposed only to support — after the war — Russian efforts to achieve security. It was the aim of the United Kingdom Government to find a settlement that would satisfy the first without antagonising the second.

In the United Kingdom draft of late April, territorial aggrandisement and interference in the Internal affairs of European peoples were abjured, but “full regard” was to be had to “the desire of the U.S.S.R. for the restoration of its frontiers violated by the Hitlerite aggression.”

*Mutual Assistance* — In the treaty as signed a course different from any of those previously proposed is adopted. Two lines are laid down:

(1) A bilateral guarantee of assistance in case of attack. This guarantee is to remain in force for twenty years, or longer if not terminated by either party, unless the following alternative comes into effect:

(2) A system of collective security. No machinery is suggested, but it is to be multilateral, and to be “for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression.”

*General Comment* — The present treaty is the alternative proposed by the United Kingdom after failure to agree with the U.S.S.R. on the details of a treaty embodying territorial terms. While it creates a defensive alliance of a type not originally envisaged by the United Kingdom, it does not otherwise conflict with United Kingdom policy.

Moreover, it can hardly be asserted that it is directed against the interests of others of the United Nations, or of neutral States.

#### PART III — CANADIAN POLICY

The treaty is in no sense binding on the Dominions, nor has any suggestion recently been made that the Dominions should adhere to it. It may be presumed, however, that the position remains as described by the Canadian High Commissioner on April 22, viz., that a formal proposal might be made if it were clear that the Dominions would welcome the opportunity to enter into such treaty relations.

The following objections were pointed out (in a memorandum of April 14)<sup>†</sup> to the treaty as earlier drafted:

- (1) That closer association with the U.S.S.R. would be criticized in Canada.
- (2) That it would destroy some small nations and threaten others.
- (3) That it was contrary to the Atlantic Charter.