

But the most conclusive proof, that an armistice would never be agreed to, unless Great Britain would yield (*not the point of honour only*) but her ancient, and as she deems most interesting right (and how dear it is to her we shall hereafter shew) will be found in the last clause of Monroe's letter to J. B. Warren, in which he says,

"If there is no objection to an accommodation relating to impressment other than the *suspension of the British claim to impressment* during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding ~~without the armistice~~ to the discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject. The great question being satisfactorily adjusted, the way will be open to an *Armistice*," &c.

Here then the question is put at rest.—If Great-Britain had been mistaken as to our demand of an *immediate suspension* of her *practice of taking British seamen*, it was the most simple thing in the world to have intimated, after saying, as Mr. Monroe does—*"If that is the only objection on the part of Great-Britain to the armistice, proposed by us, why we will agree directly to the armistice, and to an immediate negotiation pending the armistice on the subject of impressment."*

But the reverse is Mr. Monroe's alternative—"If you will not agree to suspend impressment as introductory to an armistice, why we will negotiate without an armistice." Which is equivalent to saying, that an armistice will never be granted, until you yield this point.

We shall shew, by and by, that the *last offer* of treating, without an armistice, is the mere shadow of a shade—a pure phantasm, which will elude the grasp, though it is well calculated to deceive the credulous, and lead the seekers of popularity astray.

We have shewn what were the precise and only terms offered by us to Great-Britain, that while we proposed simply to withhold actual hostilities, keeping on our Non-Importation law, which we declared to be the most efficient war measure, we demanded of her not merely a correspondent cessation of captures and warlike measures, but the immediate suspension of an interesting right during the armistice, which might either be protracted by negotiation through the whole European war, or Great-Britain would have the odium of breaking it off, and thus give our cabinet all the popularity and benefits, at home and abroad, of waging a *defensive* war, in place of the odium of carrying on an *offensive* one.

Nor were the inequality, and preposterous nature of these terms the worst features in the negotiation.—Our government and minister took care not only to make Great-Britain perceive, that we were afraid to trust her during an armistice, even after she had voluntarily abandoned the two great formerly *avowed* causes of war; but they reminded her of the vast injuries she had wantonly committed upon us, and the unprecedented forbearance of the United States; and lest all this language and this extraordinary demand should not induce her to reject our proposals, orders were given to hint to her, that after these humiliations were sub-