

judged by those standards, we and our predecessors have justified our existence over the years.

My submission is that the true independence of this body cannot be maintained without security of tenure for those who hold seats in this chamber, and that any monkeying or tinkering with the constitution in this respect will destroy or at least weaken our strength.

An Hon. Senator: Hear, hear.

Hon. Mr. Roebuck: The honourable leader of the opposition made some reference to an elective Senate. I am glad that he made it clear that he did not favour this proposal. Neither do I. I do not think anybody will charge me with being other than a pretty good democrat. I believe in the rule of the people at large; and had I been asked to vote on the question, not at this point but *ab initio*, when the Senate was being formed, I might have had a good deal of difficulty in making up my mind whether I favoured an elective or an appointive Senate. But that is not the position today.

I have just returned from a marvellous trip around the world; and I spent some time in the delightful islands of New Zealand. During my stay in that country the Senate of New Zealand expired. It is now a thing of the past. One reason that it passed out is that, because of some complicated process of appointments which I do not fully understand, the elective system played a part in its composition. The result was that members of the Senate found themselves in a position analogous to if not exactly the same as that of the members of the lower house. Parliament had become a body of elected men divided into two chambers: the second chamber was a part of the political system, obeying the behests of the administration, entirely under its control, playing its game at all times.

Hon. Mr. Euler: May I ask my honourable friend if what he has said is not also true of the United States, whose Senate also is elective?

Hon. Mr. Roebuck: I shall refer in a moment to the United States Senate, but from a rather different angle. In New Zealand the people came to the conclusion that the Senate was a useless expense because it was a mere appendage of the political system, and they abolished it. While I was in that country the senators joined hands and sang "Shall auld acquaintance be forgot", and passed out—in the words of the poet—"unwept unhonoured and unsung". The same results could be brought about in Canada by the adoption of the same system.

My honourable friend from Waterloo (Hon. Mr. Euler) has just mentioned the Senate of the United States. Originally these senators were appointed by State governments; and as the leader of the opposition (Hon. Mr. Haig) said yesterday afternoon, log-rolling—and, I will add, charges of corruption; and I will add again, misuse of seats in the Senate to advance political interests in particular States, thus playing State politics in a national body—became so intolerable that, in spite of the difficulty of altering the constitution, the American people changed the method of appointment. Today senatorships are on an elective basis. I wish my voice could be heard in another place when I say that in the United States the Senate is now the important legislative body, and the House of Representatives—which is tantamount to our House of Commons—has sunk into a position of inferiority. Personally, I am not the least bit afraid of an elective provision being introduced in this house. I may be over-confident, but I think that if I wished to remain here I could be re-elected. And this applies to most of us. There would undoubtedly be a degree of mortality, but I am sure that most of us could be re-elected if we so desired. I would say to the members of the House of Commons that if we were to return here as elected representatives of the people we would immediately become the leading house; and notwithstanding the advantage they have in the matter of initiating money bills, they would be forced into an inferior position.

I do not want such a situation to come about, because I think the Fathers of Confederation acted wisely when they provided that the Senate should be a revising body of sober second thought, and that the House of Commons should be the place in which to initiate most legislation, including money bills. They intended that legislation, after it had been dealt with by the Commons, should be sent to this house, where it would be reviewed, amended and improved by an independent, judicial and patriotic body, interested above all things in the welfare of the Canadian people. That is a wise and excellent system; and it works. It has worked in the past and it will work in the future. Can you imagine an election that would send some members to this house and some to the other house, thus dividing the popular representation of the country into two chambers? What would be gained by that? And how much would be lost? How soon would there be a demand that all assemble in the same room because all are serving in the same capacity?

My general conclusion is that, short of establishing an elective system, there is no