

OFFICIAL RESPONSES

ANNEX E

13. That convoy during the Christmas holiday of 1942 lost 486 men. By that time it was too late for 931 Canadian merchant seamen or 88 percent of the losses for the entire war (Newfoundland data is not available). It was also too late for almost every one of the 198 Canadian merchant seamen captured by the Axis powers. Canadian naval seamen losses of just over 800 subsequently increased to 60 percent of their total after the Battle of the Atlantic while Canadian merchant seaman losses fell to 10 percent, but pro rata remained 40% higher than the RCN's. The reduction is a tribute to the RCN's increased participation, and the better training, better equipment, improved efficiency, and extended use of aircraft.

14. It is natural that the RCN sailors were made the heroes, for they performed many acts of heroism, often under conditions of inadequate training and equipment. It is a paradox that Merchant Navy victims of that inefficiency never had their sacrifices recognized. In the Battle of the Atlantic to the end of 1942, the risk of being killed was 8.7 times greater in the Canadian Merchant Navy than in the Canadian Navy. For the remainder of the war it was 1.4 times greater. The merchant fleet was the target, and it lacked firepower to fight and mobility to evade.

15. In *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*, the author David Zimmerman shows that; Canadian Naval Service Headquarters under Admiral Percy Nelles, National Defence under Honourable Angus MacDonald, the National Research Council under C. J. Mackenzie, and Research Enterprises the manufacturing arm, did not collaborate or communicate effectively with each other or with Britain. As a result, as late as 1944, the French, Norwegian and Polish ships under Royal Navy command had better equipment and training than the RCN. The RCN was criticized by the Allies, but the the inefficiency flowed through to make casualties in the Merchant Navy.