

### *Military Training Assistance*

141. The Government clearly approaches these activities with a certain measure of caution, as evidenced by the following statement in the DND background papers: "The provision of carefully evaluated and limited military training assistance, both in Canada and in the recipient country, is one way in which Canada can help selected friendly states."

142. The Committee finds this cautious approach to be fully justified and in certain areas would recommend further caution. The largest and longest-established programmes are those in Malaysia and Singapore (introduced in 1964). Both programmes appear to have provided tangible benefits (to the Canadian forces personnel involved as well as to the recipient governments) and have contributed to continuing good Canadian relations with these countries. It must be recognized, however, that there are certain intrinsically sensitive characteristics to this kind of assistance (particularly when it is restricted to "friendly" countries) and that in the complex and fluid Pacific environment the political risks might outweigh any potential benefits.

143. These risks and complexities are evident in the fact that since 1969 South Korea has been sending small numbers of military personnel to Canada for staff training and, in 1971, Indonesia has also been included. Even with very small numbers involved, serious diplomatic complications could arise if these countries became involved in international or certain types of internal hostilities. The Minister stated that in future for budgetary reasons, "a very large amount of assistance will be confined to Malaysia and Singapore". (p. 8:11). The Committee welcomes this statement, on the grounds that well-tested activities can be sufficiently concentrated in these two Commonwealth countries to provide benefits commensurate with the possible diplomatic risks.

### *Peacekeeping and Truce Supervisory Roles*

144. Canada's continuing representation on the Korean Armistice Commission is a hold-over from Canadian participation in the Korean War, but does not in practical terms represent any open-ended Canadian commitment in the event of a renewal of hostilities. As the Minister stated, "the extent of our involvement would, of course, depend upon our own decisions." (p. 8:14). At the same time, the Committee is concerned that no final legal settlement to the Korean War has been arrived at and that the original participant countries would, in theory, be automatically involved (under UN Command) in any new hostilities. This longstanding anomaly, and the legal, political and military implications of Canada's continuing representation on the Armistice Commission, should be thoroughly examined by the Government. The Committee believes that the establishment of a Canadian Embassy in Seoul would allow for political representation to reflect and clarify Canada's current policies on these changing issues.

145. The outlook for truce supervision or peacekeeping activities in Indochina remains highly uncertain. As the Policy Paper states, the circumstances surrounding the cessation of hostilities will determine the prospects for different types of