

While our policy should, of course, be designed and carried out to make the use of force unnecessary; while tactics should be followed that are neither provocative nor rash, nevertheless, the maintenance of force in this unhappy world of today and the clear resolve to use it as a final necessity against aggression is an indisputable obligation on us all at the present time. The deterrent value of such force, as I see it, should neither be squandered by bluff nor made impotent by loss of nerve in a genuine crisis.

Our purpose and our policy must be to avoid crises and to solve international problems. But crises, in spite of all our efforts, may occur, and dangerous and unresolved problems may persist. It is important, therefore, that the communist bloc, which we fear and which we still have cause to fear, should not get the impression that free peoples in their passion for peace and their desire to secure it by negotiation and the resolving of differences would, under no circumstances, make use of the deterrent strength they have built up for security and defence in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

This strength, though centred in the United States, is the sum total of that of many free countries, all of whom are devoted and will continue to be devoted to the ideal of peace and will strive with all their power to find means of securing that peace. That strength, then, being collective, should be used collectively if it is to be effective. This requires that every member of the coalition should know about and, if possible, should agree with the policies of the leaders as to when and how the threat of aggression, as well as its actuality, must be faced and countered. On no other basis can there be solid unity, and unity is as much a part of our strength as bombs.

We are moving, I think, into a much more fluid period or relations with the communist world than those which characterized the hard and brutal rigidity and the tense isolation of the late Stalinist period. It must be quite clear now that the new tactic of Russia is one of manoeuvre and contact, of trying everything that may help their cause; of smiles and scowls, of kicks and carrots. These tactics may be more dangerous and difficult to deal with than any ever employed by Stalin. They are certainly more complex. But at any rate, in the long run, they may offer some possibilities for negotiation and settlement. To meet them and to bring about that negotiation and settlement to which we would all give first place in our efforts, requires flexibility and imagination on our part. As "our" refers to a coalition of free states, with a cherished freedom even to differ, this is going to be difficult to combine with unity of purpose and co-ordination of methods.