

Such action may be, and in this case is, just as bloody and dangerous and as hard to bear for those who are engaged in it, as any war of old. But it does embody a new and heartening concept of arms used to defend international order and law rather than to defend national interests alone. ...

On this point ... I should like to quote a few words from a magazine which will be familiar to hon. members, though possibly not on account of its comment on international affairs so much as its humour. I refer to the New Yorker. In an editorial in its issue of November 8, 1952, I find these words:

Korea was undertaken, and stands at this date, as an attempt to honour a prior commitment among nations; that is, the United Nations Charter agreement about armed aggression. This fact, without making Korea less bloody, make Korea unique and distinguishes it from wars this nation --

The editorial is referring to the United States.

--has known and fought in the past. ...

When a policeman chases a thief, he does so because of a prior decision of the community regarding felony. The community of the United Nations, new and shaky and divided against itself, made a decision about aggression, and a bloc of non-Communist armies, egged on principally by us Americans, rushed in to enforce the global ordinance in the name of collective security. It may be a mess, and the events leading up to it may lack clarity, but nobody need apologize for police action in support of world belief, and nobody should belittle the word "police". It is a good word, and cannot be dissociated from justice and peace. ...

Another point of importance in the policy Canada holds towards Korea and the Far East generally is our belief that it is essential that Western and Asian democracies should maintain in this matter the highest possible degree of unity of purpose and action. We do not believe, accordingly, that the Western powers should press for military or economic measures, at the United Nations or elsewhere, which would certainly not be supported and indeed might be actively opposed by important non-Communist Asian states, and which without such support would be less effective in ending the Korean war than in extending it.

This principle has guided our policy in this matter in the past, and it will continue to guide us in considering any such proposals which may be made in the future. We think that such proposals should be considered, not emotionally or from the standpoint of our feelings about the Communist regime in Peking, which we detest, but in the light of our United Nations obligation to stop aggression in Korea, and from the point of view of whether their value in that respect is more than offset by the risk of precipitating a war on the mainland of China which, it is clear, would not stop there. It is, of course, very natural indeed to desire to hit the aggressor in new places and with new weapons, but it is also wise to realize that in consequence he may also hit us somewhere else and with new weapons. There are, for instance, about two million people on the very small and rocky island of Hong Kong.

...I should like to say a few words about the concept of a security arrangement in the Pacific along the lines of the Atlantic Pact -- a concept which we usually embody in the words Pacific Security Pact.