The SAP finds at least three major problems with this agenda which, it must be remembered, is an integral feature of the purported 'new mind-set' of the 1990s. The first, is that it requires the procurement of (mainly US) weapons systems designed for long-range strike and inderdictive strategies (e.g. F111's, missile carrying frigates and long-range submarines) which, because of their cost, limits the numbers we can buy and constrains the overall effectivity of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in carrying out their designated tasks. The second, that with the focus still effectively on traditional security concerns and traditional horizons, the capacity of the ADF to deal with the much more likely threats to Australia's sovereign territory (smuggling, drugs, illegal immigration) is seriously impaired. The third, and perhaps most obvious in the context of this section of the paper, is that Australia's defence and security agenda can look menacing and provocative from the perspective of our regional neighbours, who hear much about cooperation and integration but who see Australia continuing to spend approximately as much on defence as all of the ASEAN states combined, and continuing to arm itself with weapons derived, primarily, from the US global arsenal.

The SAP response is designed to enhance strategies of cooperation and integration while enhancing Australian security in the post-Cold War era. This it seeks to do by rejecting the traditional 'expeditionary force mentality' in favour of a smaller, more precisely trained ADF, concerned with the defence of Australia and its immediate maritime surrounds, and a reliance on non-military projects of cooperation and integration within the Asia/Pacific region. This, it suggests, will allow for a cheaper, yet more coherent approach to security and defence, less reliant on US weaponry and geopolitical intent and more conducive to confidence-building measures in our immediate neighbourhood.

The difference between this format and those represented by the 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policies is as much a difference of conceptual horizons as strategic ones. In particular the SAP perspective emphasises an inclusive approach to security and defence and to global politics in general, rather than one which excludes so much, even while invoking notions of 'new mind-sets'. In this regard the question of security is re-formulated in order that Australians might consider not only traditional state-centric conflict but other contemporary issues (of global ecology, gender, ethnicity and poverty) which simply cannot be reduced to the parameters of the Westphalian model. With its concern also for the destabilising and