

the FSC itself. Much of the original agenda of the FSC (e.g. the Code of Conduct, revision of the Vienna Documents) has been completed, although there is room for sustained dialogue on implementation, as well as the inclusion of regional measures. Other issues continue to be troubling (e.g. proliferation). In addition, a number of the more pressing issues in European security (internal war, migration, terrorism and crime) fall largely outside the traditional state-based and military orientation of the FSC. It is striking, in this context, that few of the more substantial products of the Istanbul Summit were in any obvious sense "products" of the FSC.³⁸ This reflects the somewhat narrow focus of the Forum on technical aspects of the politico-military dimension, as well as its apparent marginalization in the OSCE as a whole. At a deeper level, it perhaps reflects the fact that as the CiO noted in 1996, "the Forum was, after all, only the sum total of the States represented in it and the vital political impulse was often missing."³⁹

On the other hand, the FSC does possess a number of advantages in furthering security in Europe. One is its specific expertise in certain areas that remain of substantial concern (e.g. verification). A second is the relative informality of the forum which arguably permits more open and sincere consideration of security issues. A third - shared by the OSCE as a whole - is inclusiveness; of the European organizations discussed above, it is the only one with universal membership. A fourth is that its approach is essentially co-operative and persuasive, rather than conditionality-based and coercive. These two factors arguably enhance its legitimacy and its effectiveness as a vehicle for serious exchange in matters of security. Fifth, the FSC has an impressive track record as a vehicle for promoting agreements of general interest to European states.

One further point bears mention. One persistent implicit theme in this analysis has been the gradually diminishing salience of traditional military aspects of cooperative security in Europe and the rise of new security issues that do not fit neatly into the political/security, economic, and human rights "baskets" that have dominated the OSCE's institutional development up to this point. Instead, particular issues (e.g. conflict prevention, intra-state conflict, peace-building) involve elements of all three. In this context, an excessively rigid demarcation between these functional areas may be an impediment to the development of integrated institutional approaches to security-building. Some blurring of the boundaries has already occurred, as with the FSC's consideration of issues related to democratic control of armed forces.

This leads us to consideration of what (if anything) to do with the FSC. The member states of the OSCE have three options with regard to the OSCE. One is to leave it as is; a second is to wind it up; and a third is to reformulate its agenda so that it can more directly address currently more pressing issues related to European security.

The Status Quo Option

³⁸ This problem is hardly new. The report of the 1996 review meeting noted that "over a period of nearly two years, the Forum ... had not succeeded in producing a single agreed document." "Report of the Chairman-in-Office to the Lisbon Summit" (29 November, 1996), RM96EW09, p.8.

³⁹ *loc. cit.*