

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

It appears that the States parties would have to rely on the faithful implementation of this article by chemically developed countries and on their commitment to remove restrictions. As my delegation said earlier, we hope that during the Prepcom, or in the future stages, we will render our efforts in order to rectify these shortcomings. In the meantime, this is also an important aspect that the good will and intentions of the States parties during the time of implementation will somehow rectify them. The only point which my delegation would like to reiterate again here is the composition of the executive council, which has always been an important subject in the Ad Hoc Committee during the preceding years. As a representative organ of the conference of the States parties, its composition should reflect the aspirations of the whole. Unfortunately, the provisions governing the composition of the executive council are far from being a text warranted to be included in the convention as it stands right now. That is why my delegation from the very beginning expressed its view as to the content of the text and also the procedure which led to the appearance of it in the draft convention. The inherent problems of the present provisions are as follows. Firstly, the geographical divisions are real ones which only reflect the cold war division. One of the results of the termination of the cold war was the removal of artificial divisions in Europe. Now the situation has developed in such a way that the former East European States apply for membership in NATO. Yet in order to guarantee a number of privileged seats for certain States, this East-West division of the cold war has been reinstated in the text, which does not reflect the realities of our time.

Second, although all States are considered to be equal, yet some are taken as being more equal than others. Designating privileged seats to certain States is in no way compatible with the sovereign equality of States. This is a security treaty in which the industrial criterion plays a varying role in different geographical regions. For some, the security implications of the convention will stem more from other aspects rather than the industrial aspect. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot go along with the outdated idea of permanent or quasi-permanent seats in the executive council. Some privileged seats have been designated in each regional division without any justification or explanation. For example, for Asia the notion of four privileged seats was never negotiated in the Ad Hoc Committee. Following some private bargains, suddenly the magic number four appeared in the text, which never commanded consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee. These privileged seats have not been balanced by corresponding responsibilities and obligations. Certain States parties receive favouritism in the executive council - they should assume more obligations and financing or providing assistance to other States parties for better implementation of the convention. They should agree to shoulder the task of transfer of technology to the other States parties for the development of their chemical industries. At present, a European State stands more than a 20 per cent chance to be elected to the executive council, while this chance is reduced to less than 10 per cent for an Asian State. These handicaps should be removed in order to make the executive council more democratic and closer to representing the aspirations of the whole international community, since this fact is of immense importance for the universality of the convention.