In my opinion, the judgment was properly entered on these findings for the respondent.

Reading the answers to the first and sixth questions together, the effect of the findings, viewing them most favourably to the appellant, is, that the deceased's injuries were caused by the negligence attributed to the respondent by the answer to the sixth question, and the violation by the deceased of the rule which prohibited his entering between moving cars, and, assuming that the violation of the rule was but a negligent act on the part of the deceased, is a finding that the injuries were caused by the joint negligence of the respondent and the deceased; and that finding is conclusive against the right of the appellant to recover.

I am inclined to think, however, that the finding is not so favourable to the appellant as I have assumed, and that the answers of the jury mean that, though the respondent was negligent, the efficient cause of the accident was the deceased's own act of entering between the moving cars in violation of the rule which forbade him to do so.

It was argued by counsel for the appellant that the jury have not found that the violation of the rule was the causa causans of the accident, and that, in the absence of such a finding, the judgment should not have been entered for the respondent. I am unable to agree with that contention; but, if it were well-founded, there was, in my opinion, no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have found that there was the interposition between the act of the deceased and the happening of the accident of anything which severed the causal connection between his act and the injury which he met with.

As is said by Mr. Beven in his work on Negligence, 3rd ed., p. 88, the decision in Smith v. London and South Western R.W. Co. (1870), L.R. 6 C.P. 14, establishes that "when negligence is once shewn to exist, it carries a liability for the consequences arising from it, whether they be greater or less, until the intervention of some diverting force, or until the force put in motion by the negligence has itself become exhausted." . . .

[Reference also to the same work, pp. 89, 152, 155.]

The act of the deceased . . . his entering between the moving cars, was a negligent act, and it is immaterial . . . what his view of the possibilities of it was. . . .

Counsel for the appellant cited and relied on Lake Erie and Western R.W. Co. v. Craig (1896), 73 Fed. Repr. 642, as authority for the proposition that, unless it is found that the