

itself, considered apart from any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable by Morality at all."

Now it is not the object of this brief paper to attempt to maintain the Kantian hypothesis in regard to the nature of the Will, or his system of Ethics founded upon that hypothesis. The writer wishes merely to point out that the argument which Mr. Herbert Spencer regards as demonstrative of the fallacy of Kant's reasonings, does not really grapple with the main question. It is evident on a moment's thought that if Kant's argument rests upon a proposition which Mr. Spencer regards as inconceivable, Mr. Spencer's rests no less manifestly upon a proposition which Kant would not accept as true. In other words, the conception of the Will which Spencer formulates and makes the basis of his argument is not Kant's conception at all. They are not, therefore, writing about the same, but different things. Kant's Will is an entity, Spencer's an accident. Kant may or may not be able to exclude from his conception of Will, the element of purpose, but he certainly would exclude from it the idea of a purpose. Herein lies the gist of the whole matter. Kant's Will has character, individuality, a power of self-direction and control. Spencer's Will is an automaton, or a blind impulse, a something which moves only as it is moved. Or it may be that while Kant is discoursing of the Will considered as a distinct entity, Spencer is speaking only of volition, the mere act of Will, or Will considered as an act, a forth-putting in presence of some determining and controlling object? Whatever may be the correct analysis of the two conceptions, it is, as I have said, obvious that they are fundamentally different. Hence Spencer's *reductio ad absurdum*, fails to be applicable and falls to the ground.

If I were disposed to go into the metaphysics of the question I might point out the difficulty in determining what Spencer means when he says "the quality of the Will is determined by the quality of the end contemplated." If he means simply that we have no other means of determining the quality of the Will, the remark is a truism, and does not bear on the argument. He probably means more. The question then arises, If in the presence of a given end the given Will is infallibly directed towards that end, must this not be by reason of some inherent quality or susceptibility in the Will, to which that end appeals?