

in strange contrast to his generally lucid and logical treatment of philosophical questions.

Undoubtedly the sentiment of devotion which has been attached to the conception of a personal, intelligent deity will be greatly modified, as we know it is in individual instances, with a decline of belief in such a being; but its object must be in the future what it has been in the past—man—with this difference, that whereas in the past man has worshiped, unawares, his own nature in an imagined objective being, in proportion as this illusion is discovered he will make his intellectual and moral nature the direct object of his love and devotion, and the improvement of his race, not the glory of God, the object of his efforts. Theology will give way to anthropology, the worship of God to the contemplation of humanity and to the realization of noble ideals, by the recognition and cultivation in man of all that is lofty and grand in the theological conceptions of God.

"It may not be consonant to usage," says John Stuart Mill, "to call this religion; but the term, so applied, has a meaning, and one which is not adequately expressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may be willing to admit that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty toward which are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that person has a religion. . . . Many, indeed, may be unable to believe that this object is capable of gathering around it feelings sufficiently strong; but this is exactly the point on which a doubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of Comte; and we join him in condemning, as equally irrational and mean, the conception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting its existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity of personal enjoyment" (Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 122).

"With the general tenor of this passage," says Fiske, after quoting the above passage from Mill, "I heartily agree. I have no sympathy with those critics who maintain that the idea of humanity is an unworthy idea, incapable of calling forth to a high degree our sentiments of devotion and reverence. . . . We may still further admit that all morality may be summed up in the disinterested service of the race, such being, as already shown . . . the fundamental principle of the ethical philosophy which is based on the doctrine of Evolution. And it is, moreover, easy to sympathize with the feelings which led Comte formally to consecrate the memories of the illustrious dead, whose labors have made us what

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