e a uetente the Son the early 1970s, both super-powers ch rem<sub>field to</sub> create a relaxation of tension in might iternational relations and to avoid conntirely ontations with each other that could to possiad to war. Initially, this détente process since 19 as heartily welcomed by Yugoslavia as Ameri possible source of peace and disarmassume ent and as a means of ending the pts to old War atmosphere through the disa. Such antling of the blocs. After all, since Yugosla950 Yugoslavia had been on record as a on extrarm proponent of peaceful coexistence. per-powdvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Vice-President, ne agaiteclared then in the United Nations eldt stateneral Assembly:

s freed the people of Yugoslavia cannot accept three be the assumption that mankind must tothe Yu day choose between the domination of one great power or another. We concriticis sider that there is another path, the difmarks ficult but necessary path of democratic nev aff struggle for a world of free and equal nations, for democratic relations among an veri d this a sta Brezhn of nations on a basis of equality.

To this idea of peaceful coexistence, ne" citdwocated by many nonaligned countries, evemerized avector of the idea of action mmines described by President Tito in a speech ovak "in Rangoon on January 16, 1955:

nvasic Active coexistence is active engagewas the ment to ensure that all international problems, even the most complicated and acute ones, those that are the main nal la source of international tension, are setvelopic tied peacefully, through negotiations.

again This contribution was one basis for be inteYugoslavia's large influence within the furth-nonalignment movement. With such a y of thistory of leadership in the search for ency peaceful coexistence, it is not surprising al Conthat Yugoslavia, as a leader of the nonhen lalignment movement, was in the forefront

of those urging *détente*. What, then, was t quittle dilemma in Yugoslav eyes regarding eats the *détente* process of the 1970s, which noiseemed to be pursuing the lines of "active, r fro peaceful coexistence?"

are n The problem was that since the mad Second World War Yugoslavia had deeen in pended on the particular counterbalancing imet of the great-power blocs to help preserve cture its independence and its unique social ecom identity. As a result, it was able to ine we crease its influence in international affairs gosla to the point where it was an important ent connecting link between Eastern, Western emen and nonaligned countries. It could influence the socialist development of the nonaligned countries while, at the same time, attempting to inject more liberal ideas into the East. This influence was due mainly to its leadership position in the nonalignment movement.

The beginning of détente, however, heralded the end of the influence and efficacy of nonalignment, which was mainly a movement in opposition to the Cold War. As the détente process grew, the nonaligned countries found that their notion of themselves as intermediaries in the Cold War struggle - a role that had enhanced the prestige of the nonalignment movement – had been negated by the super-powers. The nonaligned countries were still insisting on the need to abolish blocs even at the time when the two blocs were negotiating over their differences rather than threatening the independence of the nonaligned countries.

The détente era signaled the possible end of bloc conflicts over various noncommitted areas or countries. Confrontation politics were to be replaced by the politics of negotiation as the super-powers instituted diplomacy by conference. But since the *détente* process was monopolized from the beginning by the super-powers, there was a tendency for them to try to solve all international problems without necessarily communicating with other involved countries. Yugoslavia discovered that the status of smaller countries like itself could be used as part of an agreement rather than as an object of conflict as it had been during the Cold War. The outcome for a small country in such a case, however, could conceivably be the same – domination by a super-power – though by a different method. Furthermore, there were none of the perquisites for the small country that wooing during the Cold War period had provided. Nor was there the influence the country in question might have garnered by keeping both super-powers at arm's length.

The détente process thus raised in nonaligned Yugoslavia fears of its position under détente conditions. Its leaders became more wary in their pronouncements about détente. The Yugoslavs also had very real misgivings about their future if the United States and the Soviet Union should agree on Yugoslavia's position and then consider it a closed subject. On the other hand, Yugoslavia, as a leader of the nonalignment movement and one of the major agitators for Soviet-American negotiations to reduce conflict, could not oppose détente as such. Its name was very closely linked to efforts by the nonaligned countries to promote *détente*. Like other small countries, therefore, Yugoslavia began to oppose détente as a manifestation of "great-power domination".

Détente process monopolized by superpowers