

signs of the times were to be looked for, if anywhere. The interrogation of Earl Russell in the House of Lords, and the reply of the Foreign Minister, have fully justified our remarks. It is certain now that the action of the British Government would be prompt and decisive in defence of our treaty rights and duties, if events at which Lord Derby some what darkly hinted, demand our interference. Whether such events are likely to occur is altogether another question; but in the opinion of the Foreign Office, the peace of Europe is very far from being assured for many years to come. That, at least, is a fact to be seriously noticed, if not anxiously criticised.

The first reflection that it suggests is the probability that the next conflict in Europe will affect even greater interests than the last, and be spread over a much wider area. It is certain that France will again, of her own free will, encounter the power of Germany single-handed, and it is not less certain that her alliance, with Austria for example, would bring Russia into the field against the latter Power. But Austria keeps the key of Constantinople, and in this direction, if not in that of Belgium by the action of France, or of Luxembourg by the action of Germany, our own interests would be directly menaced.

No one, so far as we can learn, doubts the perfect good faith of the Emperor is only one Power in the State, and the Old Russian party can always show a bold front, and flash in the face of the Russian people the will of Peter the Great and the achievements of Catherine. But there is even a greater power than that of the Old Russian party, or the Czar. The march of events is independent of both; and we must give Prince Gortschakoff the credit of having plainly signified as much to our late Minister for Foreign Affairs. "We have no intention," said the Prince, "of attacking the Turcomans, and shall be happy to preserve amicable relations with them if they will only keep the peace and allow our caravans to cross their territory without molestation;" and then he plainly adds that the East Indian Government must share in the responsibility of keeping the unruly Khans of Central Asia quiet. That "manifest destiny" which has made England and Russia the joint arbiters of the whole Eastern world may therefore at any time seriously compromise the relations of these two great Powers to each other.

The repudiation of the Black Sea Treaty and the annexation of Khiva are recent instances in point, proving that the admitted honesty of the Czar weighs but as a feather in the scale against "manifest destiny" when the opportunity occurs to advance the traditional policy of Russia. Like that of the Church of Rome, it cannot really be changed by events, though the statesmen who shape it to particular ends may be like the wary mariner who steers his ship and trims his sails to catch a favouring breeze. The law of Russia's political existence is "progress," and there is no counteracting law of nature to fix the limits of her expansion, until she reaches the confines of our own more advanced civilisation. It is simply not possible that the semi barbarous Khanates of Central Asia should remain in a state of quiescent indifference between two such gigantic political forces as those of England and Russia. It is equally impossible that a land locked Empire, with the vast extent and natural resources of Russia, should be forever prevented from gaining access to the ocean. These two things—perpetual progress so long as there shall remain a barbarous front

tier, and perpetual striving for the free expansion of her own resources—are at the heart and lungs of the Northern Colossus, and "manifest destiny," we may rely upon it, will sweep away like gossamer the subtle diplomatic threats which threaten them with strangulation.

It thus appears that both from the European and the Asiatic point of view, there is reason for anxiety for the future, and, at the present moment, when we have the Czar in England and our lay Government in office, we are naturally anxious to hear whether the opportunity will be turned to account in the interests of future peace. No great Power ought henceforth to "draw into war." When certain State interests are manifestly incompatible, it is the duty of those who are entrusted with the conduct and guardianship of them to arrange the conditions of their future existence. The first step to the discovery of the *modus vivendi* in such a case is the frank admission of the necessities on either side. When these are clearly defined, the solution of the problem plainly lies within the limits of reason.—*Broad Arrow.*

THE CZAR AND THE ARMY.

Although our Imperial visitor has expressed a wish that his sojourn in this country should be considered of a private nature, and that he should therefore be spared taking part in the festivities which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been organized to celebrate the presence in this country of the Czar of all the Russias, yet there is a very general wish on the part of the English public to give a cordial welcome to the father of our new Princess, as also is there a desire on the part of the Czar to meet the people in places of public resort. But the Czar has very properly and naturally chosen his own opportunities. The private nature of his present visit has given him licence to choose his own pursuits, and while, therefore, he resigns himself to be the centre of observation of as many dwellers in London as care to gaze on him, yet his public appearances will be chiefly at places to which he has gone in the indulgence of his own personal tastes. Thus, the Albert Hall and the Crystal Palace, our two great musical institutions will be honoured with the presence of our august visitor, while the Army, and all that relates to it, will be made the special subject of inspection and inquiry by the Czar during his brief visit.

When, some time since, it became known that the Czar would be likely to visit Aldershot, to be present at a sham fight of British troops, to see our Artillery on parade, and to inspect Woolwich Arsenal, a very general feeling arose that the little military show we had to offer could not possibly impress His Majesty, and that the meagre force that we could throw into the field would seem to him ridiculous when compared with the great masses of men he has been accustomed to review in his own country and the huge army that has assembled in Germany to do him honour on his road thither. But, in point of fact, so far from England having any cause to be ashamed of her Army, she not only may congratulate herself on its practical efficiency, but may rest assured that the Emperor of Russia will not be led away by mere appearances, but will appreciate at its value a highly organized, if not a numerically strong, military force, into which enlistment is voluntary and in which forced service is unknown. With us the Army is practically a trade—the recruiting sergeant has to enter the labour market and

bid against the more liberal offers of the employers of civil labour. That he succeeds at all is a remarkable fact, but that he succeeds so well speaks highly for the administration of military affairs in this country. As labourers soldiers are not a remunerative investment, even at the price we pay for men. A civil labourer, although, perhaps, he may receive five, or six, or seven shillings a day, earns the money with which his employers pay him. The soldier, however, although he does his work, brings no money back into the Exchequer to provide for his maintenance. It is not to be wondered at, then, that the British soldier is the most expensive fighting machine in Europe, for whereas abroad people are forced to serve in the Army, whether they like it or not, with us the Army is only adopted as a profession by those who are attracted to it by the advantages the Service holds out and the permanent benefits it entails. From this point of view—and the Emperor of Russia is too practical a soldier to take any other—the English Army is altogether a unique force. Numerically weak it may be, but it is capable of expansion as necessities may arise, and it is supported moreover by an auxiliary force which itself is quite fit to stand side by side with the majority of foreign battalions. Indeed, the Militia as a campaigning force is most valuable, and has proved its powers of endurance in the autumn manœuvres in which it has been employed.

It is not only on the parade ground at Aldershot, that the Emperor purposes to make his acquaintance with the English Army. The Artillery Review at Woolwich, even as a show of numerical strength, will be a remarkable event. Our Artillery is undoubtedly, in point of equipment and general attention to all matters of detail, the most highly organized in Europe; but, that it should be gathered in such force as it will be on Thursday next, must prove to the Czar that, altho' our infantry, the battalions of which may be considered as mere frames, to be filled in as necessities arise, make no great show, our Artillery, which cannot be so hastily augmented, is kept at a considerable establishment, and that our Ordnance Corps are quite up to the Continental standard, both in efficiency and relative strength.

If we compare the reviews of this week with those which the Emperor of Russia has recently witnessed, the comparison must show our Army to be an excessively small one. But the corps His Majesty will see in England, are not of the same kind as those he has left behind him on the other side of the Channel. The material of the two forces not only differs, but the conditions of service are at variance in every respect. On the Continent, in countries where the conscription exists, the Army is always practically on a war footing. With us, in time of peace, it is simply a nucleus, on which to form a force of any strength the country may require. The worst alarmists cannot argue that the machinery we possess for military organisations is inefficient; and, while this is so, we have nothing either to blush for or to fear. It is, moreover, said that an army can be had at any time for money. We possess, then, not only the means to obtain one, but the men to fill it; and it is a great question, whether in time of real necessity we should not still maintain the exceptional credit of being the only country where the conscription is unknown, and that patriotism would not fill the ranks without our having to recur to a system of forced enlistment.—*Broad Arrow.*