

(b) Add to the likelihood that the GRVN, in the absence of a citation against the North for subversion, would revert to pressure on the Polish Delegation, resulting in effect in pressure on the Commission as a whole to leave;

(c) Lead to a decision by the Commission to refer to the Co-Chairmen, the question of violations or of the continuing validity of the agreement as a whole, with the possible consequences that pressure would mount for a Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

7. It would be most helpful to clarify:

(a) The intentions of the U.S. and South Vietnam with respect to "notification";

(b) The legal basis on which the U.S. authorities are proceeding in adhering to the view that because of the violations of the Agreement in the North, the South Vietnamese (and the U.S.) are not bound by the provisions of the Agreement dealing with imports of military manpower and material.

8. Does the State Department have any recent information as to the position which the Indians are likely to take on (a) the violations from the North; (b) the increasing military imports in the South?

S.F. R[AE]

770.

CEW/Vol. 3175

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Unites States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3776

Washington, December 14, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. PRIORITY.

Reference: Our Tel [3762] Dec 13.†

By Bag Saigon from London.

SOUTH VIETNAM – COMMISSION'S ROLE

As you are aware from our reference telegram, we have been impressed by the views of our delegation in Saigon on the best procedural framework in which to handle the present turn of events in South Vietnam insofar as the Commission is concerned. We also agree on the wisdom of keeping the Commission engaged actively on the Nam case and subversion generally. It seems to us, however, that early progress on the subversion issue will at best be difficult and will be further complicated by the quickening pace of events in Vietnam, in particular the substantially increased and conspicuous USA deliveries of equipment and the introduction of USA uniformed personnel. We seem indeed to be facing a crisis in the history of the Commission because it has now become clear that a major element in the Cease-Fire Agreement, the prohibition against the importation of man and material has ceased for the present at all events to have much meaning. The implications of this for the remaining functions of the Commission may be considerable. We thought, therefore, that it might be helpful to set out some views as from Washington on the longer-term future of the Commission.

2. Assessment of the Commission's future can usefully be made from the following points of view: (a) deterrence or direct hostilities; (b) deterrence of indirect intervention by the North; (c) conciliation of North-South differences. Our view would be that one or more of these purposes would be served by the pursuit of a more active role on the part of the Commission,