

of this activity; but as there is no self-activity except that which expresses itself in the product, and no product except that which is the expression of self-activity, will and thought are inseparable aspects of the one self-conscious subject. In will the emphasis is laid upon the subject, in thought upon the object; but since subject and object are identical, will and thought are identical, *i.e.* they are distinguishable aspects of the one self-conscious being.

If this is at all a correct account of thought and will, it is obvious that the whole self-conscious life is self-determining or free. But it is also obvious that, while it is the expression of self-activity, it is never the complete realization of freedom. There can be no thought, will, or desire without self-determination; but, since the thought of the self and the willing of the self are never the complete comprehension or willing of the self, the contrast between the incomplete and the complete self must remain, and therefore desire must remain. At the same time this incompleteness is transcended in principle just so far as there is a true conception of that wherein completeness consists; and this true conception constitutes the ideal of the moral life.

In what has been said the object has been to insist upon self-determination as the necessary condition of all action which can be attributed to the subject as his own. Whether an act is really a step in the process of true self-realization or not, it is always a form of self-activity. What is not due to the subject's self-activity is not his act, and has no moral quality, good or bad.

Now, if will is the process of self-determination, each phase in this process is a phase of self-determination.