

strike, and in every case where they have done, so they have been ready and willing to know the proper time to settle the strike themselves, and they were in this case. I am going very briefly to tell you in the short time at my disposal just the position they found themselves in and what the Government did for the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Order of Railroad Conductors and G.T.R. men.

As soon as ever the strike went on on the G.T.R. on July 18th, 1910, we became convinced by securing the most absolute and the most positive proof of the fact that the G.T.R. officials were prepared to let that strike go to the bitter end, no matter what that end might be, so long as it was not a settlement which the organizations sought. Within thirty-six hours after the strike went on we had that information definitely before us, because these organizations with their members and their money have secret service, means of getting information and we had positive assurance in actual statements and we knew of every act of G.T.R. officials, we knew they were prepared to let the strike go to the bitter end so long as that end was not a settlement with the organizations, or with the men on the spot representing the organization. You say to me, "Oh, they wanted all those old employees back who had worked so loyally and faithfully in years gone by." I say, "Yes, they did, but they expected to get those men back at their own price." That price was the relinquishment of any connection with their organizations, any connection in a concerted movement for standardization of wages and conditions of employment at first broached to the company, and they believed in waiting all the time, and did not care how long a time they had to wait, until the time would come when the organizations would be totally annihilated so far as organization was concerned. We knew that before the strike had been on forty-eight hours. Then, if you will permit me to use the expression, from that time forth we began, figuratively speaking, to sweat blood to get a settlement, to get any kind of honorable settlement that would conserve the individual and organization right of these men. We began, I say to you, to sweat blood. You talk about the settlement being disgraceful, of being unfair, of being inconsiderately applied. I want to say to you that but for the intervention of the Minister of Militia, Sir Frederick Borden, and the Minister of Labor, Mr. King, we would have got something that would have been a thousand per cent. worse. (Loud applause.) On the morning of the 27th day of July, 1910, we realized that there was no possible way of reopening negotiations or of getting into communication in any way, shape or form with the G.T.R. officials. We had called on the ground the two executive officials, Mr. Lee and Mr. Garretson. They had come there and met Mr. Hays and Mr. Fitzhugh and they had found those gentlemen sitting back there just as contented as if everything was going on nice and smoothly, sitting right there quite contentedly waiting for the end, and as I said a moment ago they were not particular what that end might be so long as it was not a settlement of these negotiations to the satisfaction of the men. When I discovered that I wired and wrote to the Minister of Labor asking him to come on the ground and assist if possible. What was the result? The Minister of Militia, Sir Frederick Borden, came to Montreal, met Mr. Hays, I presume used some persuasive methods in discussion to get Mr. Hays to come across and make a settlement of this situation, a situation that was deplorable both from the standpoint of the men, the Government, and the public generally all over Canada. In the evening, at 12.30 a.m., to be exact, on the morning