

Security Intelligence Service

relating to the conservation, development and utilization of water resources. Certain amendments were attempted, which the Chair eventually ruled out of order. Some of those motions were related to the question of the financial initiative of the Crown. They were ruled out of order. The Speaker of that day said:

I might also add that in the opinion of the Chair amendments of a substantive or declaratory nature should not be proposed to an interpretation clause.

We see clearly what the Speaker then had in front of him. He had what amounted to amendments which had nothing to do with the interpretation clauses themselves which were in the Bill. In other words, someone was trying to get around the rules by trying to work those amendments into the interpretation part of the Bill at report stage.

Let us look carefully at what is contained in the *Journals*:

It must be recognized in the first instance that motion No. 2 purports to amend the interpretation clause of the bill. Accordingly, the form and content of the motion must be consistent with the purposes sought to be effected by the interpretation clause. Although the preliminary sentence of motion No. 2 appears to be in the form of an interpretation provision, what follows is a list of prohibitions and objectives to be observed in the administration of the Act. In other words, motion No. 2 is but a substantive proposition of a declaratory nature. It neither defines nor interprets any provision of the bill.

The point is that in the case which forms the basis of Beauchesne's ruling, in the Speaker's preliminary ruling of yesterday the reasons that the motions were not allowed was that they neither defined nor interpreted any provision of the Bill. That is quite clearly the basis of Beauchesne's ruling. I have no quarrel with that.

If you looked at Beauchesne's quotation which Mr. Speaker included in his preliminary ruling yesterday, and then examined the facts of the case which led to it, there would be an opportunity to say: "Are the circumstances here today the same?" My argument, Mr. Speaker, is that clearly they are not, because each of the motions which I am putting is not foreign to the interpretation clause of the Bill. They are, in fact, very much a part of the interpretation clause itself. Therefore, there is a fundamental distinction between the circumstances before us today and the facts upon which the ruling by Beauchesne was made.

Perhaps I could call it six o'clock.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It being six o'clock, this House stands adjourned until 11 a.m. tomorrow pursuant to Standing Order 2(1).

The House adjourned at 6 p.m.