

civilian-operated mission the presence of armed military personnel in order to carry out reconnaissance and man checkpoints and observation posts. (Three infantry battalions provide the bulk of the force, while civilian personnel are the backbone of the observer role.)

The MFO is unique as the only peacekeeping force not under control of the UN or a regional or subregional organization. It is also unique in the degree of its use of advanced technology to complement the human presence. It is one of the best examples of the use of peacekeeping as a confidence-building measure.

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement, as defined by the United Nations, involves peacekeeping activities that do not necessarily involve the consent of all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that peace enforcement is covered by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but the linkage with peacekeeping as we understand it today was not envisaged by the drafters of that document. As mentioned earlier, there are obviously some adjustments needed to the set of UN definitions, with the most obvious being to drop the "hitherto" reference in the definition of peacekeeping and let peace enforcement stand as is, with possibly some reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter being added. In any case, for the purposes of this paper, the current definition of peace enforcement will suffice.

Peace enforcement falls short of the full range of military action allowed by Chapter VII, although that may not be very apparent to the practitioners on the ground. The definitional linkage to peacekeeping clearly implies that minimum force will be used at all times, but force will be used, and not just for self-defence. Essentially, the degree of force will be driven by the political situation and reflected in the mandate assigned, in the case of the UN, by the Security Council. Subsequent orders to the troops, including the rules of engagement, must be consistent with the situation and the mandate.

The United Nations had not conducted a peace enforcement operation on its own until the second phase of its efforts in Somalia. The initial efforts, now known as UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia) were launched as a conventional peacekeeping operation. When the lead elements became tied down in Mogadishu as the UN tried to negotiate with the various factions, the world community protested the inaction. At that point, the UN had neither the resources nor the mandate to impose peace. As matters evolved, the United States took the lead and organized the multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which eventually broke the back of resistance and allowed the delivery of aid to the worst-affected parts of the country. The Security Council approved this action in advance and assured itself of a political oversight role, an improvement, from the UN standpoint, on previous situations in Korea and the Gulf.

Once the situation had stabilized, planning began for a transition from UNITAF to a new UN force, designated UNOSOM II. This new force would be large, heavily equipped and, most important, or so it was thought, mandated to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This use of force extended to the forcible disarmament and demobilization of renegade factions. In the event, for a number of reasons—many related to factors beyond the control of UNOSOM II, and most related to the role the United States was playing both in and outside UNOSOM—the mandate, in particular the disarmament aspect, has never been executed in full. Despite the problems, there have already been a large number of lessons learned with respect to peace enforcement operations.

The main lessons relate to questions of command and control—there can only be one executive authority—and unity of command—there can only be one set of operating procedures. These can only be in place when there is unanimity of political will among all members of the Security Council and all participants in the force. It is also clear that the UN currently has difficulty in establishing the necessary field

