

missile, a mobile missile with intercontinental range, was visually similar to the first stage of the SS-20 missile, slated for destruction under the Treaty. In order to avoid the possibility that the first stage of the SS-25 might be confused with the first stage of the SS-20 (whose presence would be a violation of the Treaty), and to ensure that SS-25 production and deployment was not serving as a cover for the buildup of an illegitimate SS-20 force, the two sides developed specific cooperative verification measures, which complement the verification done by portal monitoring.

Within six hours of a request from the US, the Soviet Union must open the roofs of the fixed structures for SS-25 launchers and leave them open for twelve hours. The SS-25 missiles must be displayed so that they can be photographed by satellite. Six such requests can be made each year. If the US was to deploy an ICBM with a stage similar to a stage of one of its INF missiles, these procedures would apply to them as well.

SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

A consultative mechanism, known as the Special Verification Commission (SVC), acts as the final check in the verification procedure. If questions are not resolved through the verification process, or by a short-notice inspection, each party to the Treaty can call a meeting of the SVC to discuss the matter. Here each party can raise questions of compliance or interpretation. Meetings of the SVC can be held at whatever level is required — technical, political or diplomatic. In most cases, it is desirable to deal with a matter at the technical level before it becomes a political issue, but the SVC allows a question to move right up to the diplomatic level, if it cannot otherwise be resolved. Unlike the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), established under the SALT treaties, the SVC does not meet regularly. A meeting of the SVC, held in Geneva, is convened upon request, whenever it is deemed necessary.

BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENTS (BCA)

European countries are not signatories to the Treaty, but some have INF missiles based on their territories. These 'basing countries' signed separate agreements with each of the superpowers. The US undertook an exchange of notes with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. A similar exchange occurred between the Soviet Union and each of Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany. These five Western countries also signed an agreement with the US detailing how the notification and inspection process would be handled. Such basing country agreements (BCA) formalize the willingness of European countries to accept the Treaty's inspection process, and will help to ensure that the process is carried out properly.

Table II INF Treaty Verification Structure

National Technical Means (NTM)
Exchanges of Data
Baseline Inspections to verify initial data exchange
Elimination inspections to verify proper procedure and completion of elimination
Permanent Portal Monitoring at a production facility
Cooperative Measures
Short-Notice Inspection
The Special Verification Commission

IMPLEMENTATION

Institutions

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRC) were established by the US and the Soviet Union in 1987 to ensure an adequate form of communication between the superpowers, and to help lower the chances for the outbreak of nuclear war. All notifications of inspections and all data exchanges under the INF Treaty are carried out through these centres.

In the Soviet Union the NRRC structure is also used to carry out the inspection requirements of the Treaty. In the US, however, a new organization, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) was established to meet the US inspection requirements. OSIA was instituted in January 1988 under the direction of the US Department of Defense (DOD). A DOD-appointed representative runs OSIA, aided by two Deputy Directors, one appointed by the State Department, and one appointed by the FBI. This interagency mix reflects the range of requirements that the inspection process must meet — from internal security, to arms control, to national defence.

When the Treaty first entered into force the Soviet Union and the US supplied each other with three lists of two hundred people each: one list of aircrew; one list of inspectors for routine and short-notice inspections; and one list of inspectors for the portal monitoring system. The names on these lists can be changed, but all personnel are subject to approval by the other party.

Progress

For the most part the Treaty has been successfully implemented to date. As of 1 June 1989, the first anniversary of the Treaty, 324 US missiles and 945 Soviet missiles had been destroyed. Thirty-five of seventy-two