the Security Council;" for UNFICYP, "with the consent of the government of Cyprus . . . to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." It is up to the Secretary-General to interpret the mandates and put them into actual practice.

The largest, most difficult and complex operation took place in the Congo from 1960-64. A force of twenty thousand men was initially deployed to "provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until . . . the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the government to meet fully their tasks." The newly independent government was untrained, weak and ineffective at a time when Belgium, the former colonial power, sent troops back into the country, ostensibly to protect its nationals from the outbreak of violence. The crisis in the Congo resulted from the combination of ineffective government; rival claims to power, with the USSR and the US backing opposing sides; and the attempt, with the support of Belgium, of the mineral-rich province of Katanga to secede — in all, a prescription for chaos. The UN, itself embroiled in all of these issues, barely managed to contain the situation. UNIFIL, in Lebanon since 1978, has experienced somewhat similar difficulties.

Other mandates have been more limited, requiring fewer personnel to monitor and report on cease-fires or alleged cross border infiltrations. A particularly unique operation took place in West Irian in 1962, where a UN force actually "managed" the territory during the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule. The most recent operation in Lebanon calls for an interim force "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces . . . restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area."

Just a brief look at the thirteen UN operations shows how peacekeeping has evolved from the limited function of observing and reporting on a cease-fire to the more complex and difficult tasks of supervising the withdrawal of troops, preventing a renewal of hostilities, maintaining law and order, preventing infiltration, restoring normal conditions and also, in some cases, assisting local populations in economic activities and the provision of humanitarian services.

There is a wide range of responsibilities, which vary from case to case. Monitoring a negotiated cease-fire between state belligerents is one thing. Attempting to do the same in a civil war or guerrilla type situation where there are no clear battle lines and where independent non-government parties are entirely self-directed and unresponsive to the UN or the norms of international law is quite another matter. Daily reports from Lebanon are adequate testimony of how difficult

it is to manage that kind of situation and attempt to restore peace.

After all, restoring and/or establishing peace is the ultimate purpose of peacekeeping. But a distinction has to be made between actual **peacekeeping,** the containment of conflict, and **peacemaking,** the pacific settlement of conflict. Too often the failure of peacemaking is wrongfully attributed to peacekeeping. The confusion is, however, understandable. For example, a UN peacekeeping force has been in Cyprus since 1964. Despite many efforts, the Greek and Turkish communities are still at loggerheads. No peaceful solution is in sight. Yet the peacekeeping operation continues and actually contributes to the maintenance of the status quo. If it didn't, violence might escalate and war occur, with possibly devastating consequences for the region and beyond. After a time the parties see the advantage of keeping UN troops in place. A delicate peace is maintained, and the parties, by avoiding a final settlement, don't have to give anything away.

This of course raises the problem of duration. UNFICYP has been in Cyprus for 23 years, and UNEF I existed for ten years before being thrown out. UNTSO has been in the Middle East since 1948. These and the other peacekeeping operations have been crucial in containing crises of such great magnitude that they threatened to involve the superpowers in direct hostilities. But that avoided, peacekeeping goes on with no resolution of the conflicts in sight. There are exceptions: UNEF II was absolutely critical in helping to establish conditions which in turn led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Still, the problem of duration has to be confronted. No matter how difficult, it is much easier to start a peacekeeping operation than to end one. The potential dangers of renewed or escalating hostilities are too great a risk.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

It is therefore a very important matter to examine the nature of a conflict in order to assess whether peacekeeping could contain the situation and lead to a settlement. Who are the parties in conflict? What are the issues? Are they of recent or longstanding origin? Is there room for manoeuvre and compromise, or is it, in the eyes of one or another of the parties, an all-or-nothing situation?

Over the years peacekeeping has been introduced in a variety of crises and situations which seem to defy solution. Some examples would be the Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon. In many cases, non-governmental parties with foreign governmental assistance in civil war situations are not responsive to international pressure. The politics of the situation may well go beyond the actual area of hostilities. And, as is so often the case, the superpowers back opposing sides. It is difficult to get