

day increases the chances of "tip-and-run" sea and air raids against ports and other military objectives in Newfoundland and Eastern Canada.

4. Should Japan join with the Axis Powers in war against us—and this eventuality is becoming more probable—it may be that she will actively engage in similar raids against our Pacific Coast. Such a contingency, however, should be considered as a possibility rather than a probability, as there are important political (U.S.A.), strategic and tactical reasons for Japan retaining all her forces in the Western Pacific.

5. Our plans for the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts are still in course of execution. In general, it may be said that our Army formations now manning Coast Defences, or in mobile reserve in coastal areas, are sufficient rapidly to contend with any limited enemy raiding forces which might attempt to land in the vicinity of suitable objectives and attack them; but we continue to find ourselves inadequately furnished with Naval and Air forces, and with anti-aircraft guns and equipment, to ensure that raids by hostile naval or air forces against ports, the shipping in them, and other important objectives, are met with adequate resistance. In the existing circumstances, covering forces provided by the Royal Navy in the form of ocean escorts are a vital part of the defences of the western Atlantic, but these are barely adequate for this essential duty.

6. The maintenance and protection of Canadian Defended Ports, of focal points of shipping, and of the North Atlantic sea-routes, are essential to victory. To ensure this, we must have adequate Naval and Air forces to protect our shipping lanes and bases. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is of the opinion that in the defence of the North American continent, Newfoundland represents a highly important outpost, and is in many ways our first line of defence. Flanking as it does the trans-Atlantic air and sea-routes to North America, a strongly-held Newfoundland upon which are based adequate Navy, Army and Air forces, represents a powerful deterrent to enemy air and surface action against our coasts and territorial waters.

7. On the Pacific coast, the possibility of serious attack by surface-vessels or ship-borne aircraft of the Axis Powers is remote. The volume and importance of shipping in the Eastern Pacific is far less than that in the Atlantic, and there are no military objectives of sufficient importance to justify other than very small-scale tip-and-run raids, the effects of which would have little military significance. An actual attempt at invasion on this coast by Japanese forces is considered highly improbable.

#### 8. *Conclusions*

The Chiefs of Staff Committee consider that in the present circumstances and in those likely to obtain in the near future, the basing of adequate Naval and Air Forces to provide a Striking Force adequate to protect our shipping is of the first importance. These naval and air forces must operate from secure bases. An increase of Naval and Air forces on the East Coast of Canada is therefore necessary, and this is only possible by the active co-operation of such United States forces as can be made available for this purpose. Ends.