

military age. There is thus ample room for *de facto* exemptions beyond the few cases for which the federal law provides. These are—first, the members of the Federal Diet or Parliament; second, the persons actually filling three specially enumerated posts in the Government and higher spheres of administration; third, certain enumerated grades of *employes* in the federal post and telegraph offices, the powder magazines, &c. and fourth, the frontier police, which may be considered as a sort of permanent military corps. In addition, the superintendents of prisons, lunatic Asylums, &c. having a certain immunity of service. The theory of the law in all these cases is not that of exemption, but rather of temporary prevention or *ex-officio* immunity, something in the nature of the privileges accorded to members of Parliament in this country during the session. Should this exceptional immunity cease by the vacation of the office conferring it within the period of age during which each is liable, the person having availed himself of it, is supposed to be obliged to make up for lost time in the drill and instruction of the class to which he belongs. Practically, however, this scanty list of exemptions is largely supplemented by the legislation of the several cantons in favor of the members of their respective Governments and Legislatures. Moreover, the duty of military service does not bear on *bona fide* absentees. A Swiss, at any period of his military liability, is perfectly at liberty to expatriate himself without asking leave of any one. If a casual absence happens to coincide with a period of service, he is regarded as a soldier on duty, and must ask for furlough in regular form, which is readily granted on reasonable cause being shown. The penalties for military misdemeanour in time of peace are little more than nominal, but while on duty, each man is placed under military law—withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the civil courts—and, whatever the nature of his offense may be it is tried by courts-martial. All those who from any cause whatever, *ex-officio* exemption, absenteeism, or physical disqualification, do not perform, either in whole or in part, the military duty incumbent on others, are subject to a very moderate capitation tax in compensation. It will be seen, therefore, that the Swiss system, although theoretically the precise contrary, has yet in practice a large element of voluntarism. In the projects of reform which are now under consideration, and to which I shall hereafter have occasion to refer, this element—never openly recognized—is sought to be done away with altogether, and a more strictly obligatory system to be rigidly enforced. I greatly doubt whether this policy, though legally correct, will, in the end, be found judicious.

One of the most zealous and able of the Swiss army reformers, Mr. Stampfli, a member from Berne of the Representative Chamber of the Federal Legislature, reported, on behalf of a special committee in 1866, that whereas the preceding census (December 1860) showed the number of males in Switzerland to be 1,171,486, of whom 423,856 came within the prescribed age, the number of men actually performing that duty in all the three classes, *elite*, reserve, and *landwehr*, was only 186,389, or less than one-half. In other words, about 50 per cent. of the available male was, for some reason or other, not used at all.

Mr. Stampfli further illustrates this striking contradiction between the theory of the law and its application in practice, by comparing the number of young men who, during a period of ten years, became annually

liable to service with those who actually performed it. It appears that the annual average of young men becoming liable to service during the period between 1852-1862 was 22,900 against 11,719 who appear on the lists as active recruits. So that while in theory, and by a fundamental article of the Constitution, every able bodied Swiss is more or less an efficient soldier, only about one-half, or rather less, undergo any sort of military training during any period of the 25 years, that is from 20 to 44, for which they are legally liable to duty.

I may here remark that for the few statistics I intend to obtrude, I am largely indebted to Mr. Stampfli, and making allowances for a very moderate increase of population, the figures, which he collected with the most scrupulous accuracy in 1866, are still the most available for all practical purposes of argument. I cannot, however, follow Mr. Stampfli to the extent of the severely logical conclusions he deduces from his figures. I believe on the contrary, that it is with the military system of Switzerland as with many other time honored institutions that have grown with a nation's growth—one of their chief merits lies in the deviation of the practice from the theory, and I believe that this is quite consistent with both theory and practice being excellent and admirably suited, each to its purpose. The Swiss system is assuredly not perfect, but it has this great and incalculably important merit, that it is pre eminently *popular* in every sense of the word. I much fear that any reform the better to conform the practice to the theory will cause to appear one rous and oppressive, that which with the present latitude is regarded rather as a privilege than as a duty.

The contradiction to which I allude would be utterly inexplicable if we did not remember that, with a population of little more than two and a-half millions (or less than that of London), scattered over a territory about half as large as England without Wales, we have to deal with no less than twenty-five different Governments, each sovereign and independent. Nominally the members of the Swiss confederation are twenty two, but three of these States, and singularly enough, these three among the very smallest ones, have found a single government too little for them. Thus one half of the people of Basle, of Appenzell, and of Unterwalden respectively, have agreed, to disagree with the other half, and each of these cantons, though nominally a unit in the Federal Assembly, has in reality two distinct and complete sets of executive, administrative, and legislative machinery.

Formerly each of these governments raised, drilled, uniformed, and armed its troops as it suited its fancy. Provided each supplied its quota to the Confederation in time of need, the latter had no more right to interfere in military matters than in those of coinage duties, and postal arrangements, all of which exhibited a most beautiful variety of local eccentricities. To this day the Militia of each canton is under its own exclusive control. It drills them, officers them, equips them, arms them, at its own expense, in the proportion of the contingent which the Federal Assembly fixes after each decennial census, and these state or Cantonal troops only become Federal soldiers by being especially sworn into the service of the Confederation, and assuming that armlet of the cross which, with the inversion of the colours has latterly served as the emblem of neutral charity on the battle field.

But the new Federal Constitution, following on the civil war of '47, the *Sonderbunds Krieg*, made a great step towards centrali-

zation in this as in other equally important respects. Uniformity of equipment and armament was established by precise legislation, a minimum of instruction and efficiency fixed, and a certain general superintendence and control reserved to the Federal military authorities. Each Cantonal Government was to take, place on foot and maintain, in time of peace an effective force equivalent to three per cent of its population (foreign residents, which in many cantons are very numerous, being, of course excepted), and a reserve amounting to one half of the same, together four and a half per cent of the native population. In time of war the Confederation disposes of the entire force available. Nothing, of course, prevents each Cantonal government from drilling a much larger force than its Federal quota, and, in point of fact, most of them do.

Many of those who speak of and treat the Swiss military institutions as a complete, compact, and self consistent system, will perhaps be surprised to learn that very considerable difference obtains among the several cantons as regards the proportionate number of men in each performing military duty. The percentage on the male population ranges as widely as from 22 to 12 per centum between one canton and another. Thus the primordial Canton Schwyz, which claims the honor of having given its name to the Helvetic Confederation, leads, as might be expected, the way with 22 per cent. of its male population doing duty. Another of the forest cantons, Uri, and next Grisons, follow with 21, the sickly canton of Wallis, composed chiefly of the narrow, deep, and marshy valley of the Upper Rhone, which has the sad speciality of goiters and cretinism, comes last with only 12. The two great and populous cantons of Berne and Zurich form, as nearly as possible, the average between these two extremes with 16 per cent. of their male population.

The leading feature of the Army Reform Bill to which I have already had occasion to refer, is to give to federal authorities a more direct control over the cantonal forces. For this purpose it is proposed to divide the territory of the Confederation into districts not quite irrespective of cantonal frontiers, but still to a certain extent independently of them, and to place the military administration of these districts, in so far at least as regards the instruction of officers and men, immediately under the inspection of the Federal officers. To the extent that this can be effected, it will undoubtedly be a real improvement upon the prevailing system. But Swiss army reformers are not so bold in their measures as those in this country, and any change so radical as Mr. Cardwell's recent abolition of purchase would not even be dreamed of. The idea of Cantonal independence is so strongly rooted and local self government is carried to such extremes, that even under the new law the cantonal military authorities will retain the exclusive appointments of all regimental officers—each of these twenty five governments will continue to have its Secretary of State for War *in pectus*, with a cantonal staff and a cantonal military budget to match. The tendency undoubtedly, is to strengthen the federal authority at the expense of the cantonal, but many years must elapse, perhaps some terrible strain may have to be experienced, before a thoroughly centralized organization can grow out of the present tentative efforts of reform.

(To be continued.)

The Albany *Argus* says that William M. Tweed is the chief owner of the contract to pierce Hoosac tunnel and has invested a million in the enterprise.