The sole question there was, whether it was competent to the Dominion Parliament, under its general powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Dominion, to pass the Canada Temperance Act, 1878, which was intended to be applicable to the several Provinces of the Dominion, or to such parts of the Provinces as should locally adopt it. It was not doubted that the Dominion Parliament had such authority under sec. 91, unless the subject fell within some one or more of the classes of subjects which by sec. 92 were assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.

It was in that case contended that the subject of the Temperance Act properly belonged to No. 13 of sec. 92, "Property and Civil Rights in the Province," which it was said belonged exclusively to the Provincial Legislature, and it was on what seems to be a misapplication of some of the reasons of this Board in observing on that contention that the appellant's counsel principally relied. These observations should be interpreted according to the subject matter to which they were intended to apply.

Their Lordships, in that case, after comparing the Temperance Act with laws relating to the sale of poisons, observed that:—

"Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of public order, safety or morals, and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to to that of civil rights. They are of a nature which fall within the general authority of Parliament to make laws for the order and good government of Canada."

And again :-

"What Parliament is dealing with in legislation of this kind is not a matter in relation to property and its rights, but one relating to public order and safety. That is the primary matter dealt with, and though incidentally the free use of things in which men may have property is interfered with, that incidental interference does not alter the character of the law."

And their Lordships reasons on that part of the case are thus concluded:

"The true nature and character of the legislation in the particular instance under discussion must always be determined, in order to ascertain the class of subject to which it really belongs. In the present case it appears to their Lordships, for the reasons already given, that the matter of the Act in question does not properly

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