

REPORT ON THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

I.—PROBABLE NATURE OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF AMERICANS AGAINST CANADA.

1. To arrive at a conclusion as to the measures which should be adopted for the defence of Canada, it is necessary first to consider what aggressive operations the enemy would most probably undertake.
2. The frontier of Canada, from the point where it commences to run along the 45th parallel of latitude, (to the eastward of which the country bordering on the frontier is wild and but thinly settled,) extends over about 1,000 miles, divided approximately as follows;—viz: 167 miles of imaginary boundary along the 45th parallel of latitude to southward of Montreal and Quebec; 110 miles along the river St. Lawrence to eastward of Kingston; 25 miles along the Niagara Frontier, between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie; 105 miles along the Detroit Frontier, between Lake Erie and Lake Huron; the remaining 600 miles along the shores of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie and Lake Huron. Extent of Frontier.
3. Attacks may be made upon any of these sections of the frontier; in the first four cases by land forces and in the last case either by vessels of war, or by the landing of troops on the shores of the Lakes. Attackable at all parts.
4. The enemy's principal base of operations would no doubt be at Albany, a central point where there is an arsenal from whence his expeditions may be supplied, and to which there is access by the Hudson River for large steamers from New York, and by road and railway from all quarters. There is also a canal connecting the Hudson River with Lake Champlain, where under cover of the work at Rouse's Point, commanding the northern entrance to the Lake, the Americans could collect a large force within 40 miles of Montreal, and between that place and Rouse's Point the country is so flat and open that to the westward of the Richelieu River (which connects Lake Champlain with the St. Lawrence, at a point about 35 miles below Montreal) there is no obstacle to the advance of an enemy, in the summer season, over any part of it. Base of operations of enemy.
5. Montreal being moreover at the head of the sea navigation of the St. Lawrence, and the focus of all communications by land and water between the Eastern and Western Districts, as well as between Upper Canada and the Maritime Provinces of British North America, is both the commercial and strategical capital of the country. If Montreal were taken, the whole of Western Canada would be cut off from support either from Lower Canada or from the Maritime Provinces. Montreal the strategical as well as commercial capital of Canada.
6. The enemy holding that place, and in communication with Lake Champlain, would then on the one side proceed against any force that might be operating for the protection of the frontier, on the Upper St. Lawrence, whilst on the other side he would direct an attack against Quebec, with a view of obtaining possession of the key of the St. Lawrence, and of the expulsion from the country of the troops of Great Britain. On the supposition that Montreal were incapable of being defended, the enemy would most probably attack that place first and then proceed against Quebec, but in case Montreal were by any means enabled to hold out, he would probably attack both places simultaneously, in order that he might have the greater chance of taking one or the other, or both, before the winter season rendered it impossible for him to remain in the field. Attack on Montreal and Quebec.
7. If both these places were put in a proper state of defence, the enemy would be obliged, in aiming at the severance of the communication between Canada and Great Britain, or between Canada and the Maritime Provinces, to carry on two extensive expeditions simultaneously, each of them involving the necessity of a protracted siege, and, considering the short period during which military operations on a large scale can be carried on in this country, there would be every probability of successful resistance to such attacks.
- On the other hand, if no previous steps were taken for the effectual protection of Montreal and Quebec, and those places were left as at present without any efficient means of defence, there would be no possibility of holding them should a war occur with the Northern States. Then Upper Canada would have no communication with the sea; the trunk of the tree would be cut away, and the great branches—the Western Districts—must fall. There cannot be a doubt that upon Lower Canada, at Montreal and Quebec, the chief attack of the enemy would be directed.
8. In connexion with the main direct operation from Lake Champlain against Lower Canada, he would most probably send a large corps by railway, either from Albany or Rouse's Point, or from both those places, to Ogdensburg, to cross the Upper St. Lawrence, at or near that place, and operate in the Peninsula between the Ottawa and St. Lawrence rivers either against Montreal, Kingston, or Ottawa. Attack on Kingston, &c.
9. Ottawa, from its position and from its being the future seat of government, is an important point, but the chief attack of the enemy upon the centre of the country would most probably be directed against Kingston.
10. Kingston, with its fine harbour, if effectually defended, would be the best point for a Naval Station on Lake Ontario. Such a station is necessary for the maintenance and protection of a Naval force on that Lake, the command of which is essential to the defence of Upper Canada: without it the troops employed in that portion of the country would be liable to be overwhelmed by the enemy's forces coming upon them from every side, and all possibility of retiring or of receiving succour might be cut off. Ottawa. Kingston important as naval station, &c.

Irrespective of the value of Kingston as the head quarters of a Naval force on Lake Ontario, it is, from its position near the head of the St. Lawrence, and at the junction of the Rideau Canal, which connects the Ottawa with Lake Ontario, an important strategical point, both for the Naval and Military