

citizens, yet a "rum candidate," who happens to be the Mayor of Portland,—I wish they would read the very short but significant epistle of St. Jude, where he describes men who have "departed from the faith" and who are "clouds without water." He says that a distinguished trait in their character, and one by which you may find them, is that "they are not afraid to *speak evil* of dignities." I commend the study of that chapter to the gentleman, in his lectures upon this subject. It is also eminently calculated for those who conduct the press, and by many who speak personally in support of the Maine Law.

The fourth objection to the law was this—it attempts to put the responsibility for the sin of drunkenness upon the wrong party. It leaves the drinker unharmed, untouched by any penalty whatever. The reply of the gentleman is, "we punish drunkards." Very well, I am entirely willing that you should punish drunkards, and punish every man that sells to a drunkard, knowing him to be such. He ought to be punished. But the point is this, Mr. Chairman; you attempt to punish a man for selling an article for a certain use, and you hold that man altogether responsible for the sale, when he is but *secondary* in the act. Here is a man that has spirits to sell; he don't go out and solicit customers; there are instances, certainly, and such instances ought to be reprobated, and ought to be punished always. I am not speaking of exceptional cases, but of the ordinary rule. Now the ordinary mode is for a man to go in and *ask*—*solicit*—wishing to purchase, and expressing that wish or desire. Now if there is a sin committed, he is the first in the transgression. He is primary in the act—the tempter, according to the theory of your law, and therefore the chief sinner. Well, now they don't propose to punish him at all? If a man sells for a certain use, he is punishable—if a man buys for that use, and actually uses it, he escapes punishment. Now why not deal impartially, as the king of the Sandwich Islands did when he made a prohibitory law for his people under guardianship, (and a people under guardianship will bear a prohibitory law, and no other people will or should) when he made a prohibitory law, for his subjects, he put the punishment directly upon the men that bought and the men that used, and made the punishment there heavier than upon the seller. Why should not you do the same thing, and make a law that every man who uses intoxicating drinks as a beverage shall pay a fine of ten dollars at the least—or while you are upon this point why don't you perfect the job, and carry out the principle a little further; teach him, as Mr. Webster said, how very inconvenient it is to "stretch hemp without touching the ground." Perhaps such a punishment might be too wide, and sweep too far. It is barely possible that some gentlemen in the Legislature who vote for this law would be in danger, if every man was to be punished who should use a glass of intoxicating drink as a beverage. Is that the reason? Why not punish all alike, and make square work of it. If you find a man pleading for the Maine Law, with his lips wet and his breath perfumed with alcohol, he, of all men in the world, is the man to punish.

My fifth objection to this law was that it was a law which destroyed property wantonly—that in its destructiveness it served no good end—that no reasonable object was secured. The gentleman from Medford says that the rags infected by the plague are burned. Just think of that! Are such rags fit for any other thing? Is there one kind of use or other that they can be applied to? Are they fit for use in any shape?

A voice—"You may make paper of them!"

Mr. Lovejoy—What! if infected with the plague? The gentleman from Medford also says that the tools used by gamblers are destroyed; but where rests the analogy? The gentleman from Chelsea says an analogous argument ought to be constructed that it would bear the burden on its back. This is true. Now do the examples brought forward in support of this law ever carry it? Never. Not one of them. What are the uses to which gambling implements can be put? To nothing but gambling! To what uses are rags, inoculated with the plague, fit to be applied? To none; for they are unsuited to any purpose but that of destruction. But here is what is not so. The law licenses the making and use of alcoholic liquors. Under the Maine Law, distilleries and