

The report found that the Canadian navy is sufficient in many ways, and sets out in detail just what it considers is the minimum necessary to put our navy in a position so that it can fulfill its duties both at home and our commitments to our NATO allies. Just what these duties are are found at page 27 of the report, and I quote:

In the 1971 white paper on defence, *Defence in the 70s*, the commitments of the Canadian Armed Forces were listed as the protection of Canadian sovereignty; the defence of North America; contributing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and peacekeeping. In the twelve years since the defence white paper was published, nothing has happened to render any of these general commitments inappropriate. Indeed, nothing indicates that Canada may soon be able to abandon any of them.

Then the paper entitled *Background Information Canadian Frigate Project* uses much the same language in defining the role of the navy. It states, and again I quote:

Canada needs to be prepared both to protect its own sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction and to participate with the allies in a collective deterrent effort. As a country with one of the longest coastlines in the world, Canada requires a viable naval force able to do both.

It also states that a fleet of 24 vessels had been accepted as the requirement to meet Canada's commitment to collective defence, and in the report it is mentioned that 20 destroyers would be required along with support ships.

It was at that time in December 1977 that the decision was announced to acquire six frigates as the first part of a long-term future replacement program for the navy. As you know, contracts have been awarded for the construction of these frigates and I understand work on them is to start this year. Honourable senators, the cost of these ships indicates in no uncertain manner what the cost would be of modernizing our navy by replacing old ships with new, modern ships and perhaps converting others, along with normal refits. The cost of the six new frigates at ceiling price is estimated to be \$3.85 billion in 1983 dollars, and the estimated cost of modernizing four destroyers is \$650 million, and I believe that tenders have been called for the modernization of those destroyers.

Honourable senators, to emphasize the objectives of our defence policy, I quote from the address of the Honourable H. A. Olson, P.C., the Leader of the Government in the Senate, which is found in the appendix to the *Debates of the Senate* of April 12 last.

We, as members of a collective defence alliance, must make sure that we convey to those who might breach the peace that such a course of action would not be worthwhile because we have both the means and the determination to safeguard our security interests. In order to do so, while we continue to pursue with our allies the objective of greater security through arms control negotiations, we must make a tangible contribution to the development of new weapons systems to counter those that have been deployed against us, and we must maintain our agreed

levels of commitment to collective defence. Our expressions of solidarity must be backed by material evidence of our determination to meet our agreed defence commitments.

Honourable senators, I would like to offer one more quotation just to illustrate the point that there does not appear to be any difference between government objectives and the objectives of the subcommittee in regard to national defence. I quote from the National Defence Department Report dated March 1984 and entitled *Defence '83*, where the role of the Canadian forces is defined. It says:

The Canadian Forces are the military element of the Canadian Government and are part of DND. Government Policy concerning the CF takes into account national and foreign policy. The roles of the CF are developed within this framework. They are:

The surveillance of our own territory and coast lines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty.

The defence of North America in cooperation with the U.S. Forces.

The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon.

The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.

Honourable senators, since there is general agreement as to the purpose and role of our defence forces, one may well ask why the report of the subcommittee is so critical of the present state of the navy—and it is critical. I suppose the short answer is that the subcommittee is of the opinion that the navy is unable to fulfill the role required of it. Indeed, in the very first paragraph of the introduction it states that our maritime defences have so far deteriorated that immediate and drastic remedies are called for. It further states that while Canada's maritime claims have been increasing, the ability to defend them has been declining. The subcommittee is of the opinion from the testimony that it received and from personal observation that with the equipment it now has, maritime command cannot meet its commitment for the protection of Canadian sovereignty or the other obligations we have assumed.

This is a very serious allegation. Yet without going into the matter in detail, I think it must be admitted that the subcommittee has made a very powerful case to support its finding and conclusions. Indeed, I think it has shown that since 1945 we have allowed our naval forces to be neglected. We did not provide our navy with the modern ships and equipment it needed to carry out the task assigned to it.

I do not think that anyone can be blamed for this state of affairs. The country was in no mood for spending large sums of money for naval construction. There was certainly no surge of public opinion demanding that our navy be given modern ships and equipment. Indeed, I do not think the public in general knew or cared too much about fulfilling our naval obligations. I suppose the reason for this attitude was that, up to the time of the Second World War, we knew that the British Navy was there in case of need and, since 1945, we