

nuclear umbrella and by the whole NATO structure, and we tell them that as a semi-developed industrial state we cannot produce the weapons we need for our defence and thus we have to have the defence production sharing agreement. I think both those things are wrong. In fact, I do not think they are true. The point is that if we go to the Canadian people with what I would regard as the facts—and which I suspect you do not, Mr. Macquarrie—I would argue that Canadian opinion will come down on the side of non-alignment, but it depends on how the facts are presented and whether they are presented. I agree that in the present circumstances a Canadian public opinion poll would probably show support for NATO, but it would not be that overwhelming and it seems to me that those people who agree with all or some of this case, and particularly the points about the credibility gaps within our present policy, should go out and politically educate the Canadians as to the reality of the defence and foreign policy situation. It could produce a majority for non-alignment. I have a decent respect for Canadian public opinion, but because I have I think it is open to persuasion, particularly on the basis of facts.

Mr. Macquarrie: I do not think there has really been any presentation of the argument that if we do this we will offend the United States. I do not think, in all fairness, this has actually been the thrust given to the problem. I am most tremulous to suggest that I move in as a mere political scientist when talking with a leading historian, but I am wondering if over the years there has been in this country this penchant for nonalignment, if I may use that expression. Might one not say that the leaders of the state at the time of the Boer War found it very difficult to resist Canadian involvement—recalling Laurier's troubles in that regard. And I recall, too, that Borden felt there was no other choice apart from the legal situation. He felt that even the whole question of conscription was one that was forced upon him. And certainly in the world war, too. In other words, I myself would question—and that is as far as I will go because I defer to your historical knowledge—that there is anything more natural in the Canadian character which would lead us to nonalignment than to an involvement beyond our shores.

Professor McNaught: Even from the history of M. Bourassa?

Mr. Macquarrie: Bourassa was never one who carried public opinion; he carried a portion of it.

Professor McNaught: An important portion, yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: Certainly minorities are always important.

Professor McNaught: They always are.

Mr. Macquarrie: I would like to ask a couple of little questions and then I will pass.

Do you really believe, Professor, that the Soviet Union would have been restrained to any real degree in its movements against Czechoslovakia whether or not their military operation was carried out with multinational group?

Professor McNaught: I think that the diplomatic difficulties which Russia has obviously encountered during and right down to the present in the intervention in Czechoslovakia suggest very strongly that she would be deeply concerned about making that a multinational Warsaw Pact operation and might very well have thought twice about doing it unilaterally, yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: I am impressed by your point of view—I almost said “faith.” There is one comment in the quotation about General Westmoreland. I cannot believe that it is not possible for any observer with half an eye to distinguish our role vis a vis the Vietnamese conflict from Australia, South Korea and so on. I thought perhaps that that was an area in which if there were time I would not have disagreed with you.

Professor McNaught: If I may take just one minute on that last point, there is of course a difference between our role and that of Australia in South Viet Nam. However anybody, as you say, with half an eye can see that we send aid only to Saigon, and that we have certainly passed along very useful information to the Americans who are observers on the ICC. Thus, that half eye, looking out of its other quarter, can see the case I am making about our alignment, I think.

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Mr. Macquarrie: I may say, Mr. Chairman, that the half-eyed observers were the people to whom the professor referred, not to himself.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Professor, to pursue the point made by Mr. Macquarrie about the origin of our alignment, from 1899, first I do not see how you can come to that conclusion because in 1899 there was actually no conscription. It was a voluntary participation by individuals. Then you referred to the most serious of our racial crisis which has deepened steadily as our alignment and commitments deepened. I do not come at all to that conclusion. I am a Quebecker, a French-speaking Canadian, and I even get the impression that our present policy does get more support in Quebec than it does in many other parts of Canada. What do you call our racial crisis in Canada?