

prospect which would be faced with any satisfaction by the Canadian government or people.

At this time it is well to remember that the danger last summer was not limited merely to the exclusion and possible isolation of France, fateful as that might have been. The very existence of NATO, the whole North Atlantic concept, was threatened. Just as there has been among some sections of Europeans an understandable, but in my opinion a superficial and mistaken, tendency toward what I might call continental neutralism or isolationism, so there has been among some North Americans a tendency to move toward either bilateral or continental defence arrangements. There was developing a few months ago a "go it alone" psychology in this part of the world, due in part to impatience with allies but rationalized by strategic theories, based on impregnable continental defences coupled with almost exclusive reliance for victory against aggression on massive retaliation by long range planes and missiles of the intercontinental or global range. Certainly, as we all know, continental defences for North America are vitally important and may well become more important, but any implication that in themselves they would ever be an adequate basis for security is quite another matter.

I ventured to point out in an address to the National Press club in Washington last March that in my view any idea that the great coalition which we have formed for peace should be replaced by an entrenched continentalism would make no great appeal to Canadians as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression. Nor would it be likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian co-operation.

Indeed the idea of continental self-sufficiency, in the military as in the economic or political fields, makes no appeal, I suggest, either to our sense of reality or to our deepest Canadian instincts as exemplified over the whole of our history. In 1914 and 1939 Canadians were quick to recognize that a threat to the democracies of Western Europe was a threat to their own freedom; and subsequent events confirmed rather than upset this deep-seated conviction that it would not be safe or ultimately possible for us on this continent to stand aside from events in Europe. And so NATO, with the United Kingdom, the United States and France in it, is for us an indispensable instrument both for co-operation and defence. But last autumn NATO was in danger of being lost.

I may appear to be digressing, but certainly these thoughts were very much in the minds of those of us who had the responsibility for action on behalf of the government during the rapidly moving events of last summer and last autumn. I think it is well that these considerations should be put on the records of this House.