sort of running account of the details of those negotiations as hey are going on. We should of course make quite clear in advance he principles which guide us in these discussions. We should ive the details of the negotiations when we can, and we should ways give the result of these negotiations to the public. I hink we do try to do that,

: 13

95

t 0°

.

.

100

1

30

In my review today I will not devote much of my time, indeed ossibly any of my time, to Commonwealth affairs--not because I do t appreciate their importance, but because I attempted to discuss hem in relation to the Commonwealth conference at Colombo. Nor do intend to devote very much of my time to Far Eastern affairs, for e same reason. But I cannot let this occasion pass without swering, or attempting to answer, one or two questions which were sked me last night by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra ir. Green), which deal with the Far East.

In respect to one of these questions I think the hon. mber misunderstood what I tried to say last week in the discussion this subject. Last night in referring to the Commonwealth msultative committee, he said that I had made no statement as to ether or not we would join that committee. But I hoped that I ad made it clear the other day that if and when an invitation mes from the Australian government--I think we have not received yet--to join the meeting in Canberra, which will be devoted to his subject, we shall be very glad indeed to accept it and be epresented at the meeting or on the committee if one is set up at hat time.

The hon. member was also critical of our lack of leadership regard to a Pacific pact. I attempted to deal with that matter my statement last November 16 on the external affairs estimates. pointed out at that time that the situation in the Pacific in gard to a regional pact of this kind was certainly not the same the situation in the Atlantic, which had made desirable and cessary, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact. My view in tessary, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact. My view in at regard was not weakened, but indeed was confirmed by the recent monwealth meeting at Colombo. If we had taken the lead in regard this matter--we should not of course hesitate to take leadership en the occasion demands it--we would have found that at least the occasion demands it--we would have found that at feast of the countries most directly concerned with regional security the Pacific, namely, the United Kingdom and India, would not we been able to support our lead, or at this time support the tea of a Pacific regional pact. Also we knew then, as we know w, that the United States would not be able to participate at his time in negotiations leading up to that kind of pact. One ason for that attitude on the part of the United States and the lited Kingdom is no doubt the fact that a conference for this rpose, Mr. Chairman, would certainly have to include China d the U.S.S.R., if they were willing to accept the invitation to rticipate. It would be somewhat embarrassing to issue an vitation to China at this moment to a meeting of that kind. If e invitation were being issued by the government of the United agdom it might be addressed to a different post office than at to which it would be directed if it were to be issued by the rennment of the United States. And if it were being issued the government of Canada it might be addressed to a different at the government of Canada it might be addressed to a different st office in the future than that to which it would be directed we issued the invitation now. Therefore there are obviously actical difficulties in the way of calling a Pacific conference draw up a Pacific regional pact.

When I say that, I do not wish to have it understood that ^e government is opposed to the idea of a regional pact for the ^{cific.} If and when the circumstances should make it desirable, we

- 2 -