

racy; similarly, information obtained through intelligence sources can be checked against data in the register.

*Intelligence, Information and Fact-Finding Means, and Notifications/Declarations*

While notifications are useful in targeting intelligence means, intelligence means contribute little to the notification activity. Activity reporting, for example, will be a useful input to intelligence, but intelligence is normally not the basis for notifications.

*Intelligence, Information and Fact-Finding Means, and Inspections/Observations*

The synergistic effects between intelligence and information sources and on-site inspections are very high. Information from a "whistle blower," for example, has provided UNSCOM inspectors with the information necessary to know that material was being moved clandestinely out of an area in advance of an inspection. In future regional agreements associated with non-proliferation, HUMINT will be extremely important when planning authorized inspections, such as IAEA challenge inspections. Information or complaints from informants, followed by "inspections" by peacekeepers, can be very valuable in peace operations.

*Intelligence, Information and Fact-Finding Methods, and Aerial Surveillance*

Information from intelligence and other information sources can provide clues about activities that merit closer inspection by aerial surveillance. Such information can provide advance warning of activities to schedule flights over specific geographical areas. Conversely, aerial surveillance such as the overflights associated with the Open Skies Treaty may detect suspect activities which can become the focus of attention by certain intelligence sources.

*Intelligence, Information and Fact-Finding Methods, and Implementing Bodies*

Just as technical means provide highly useful information for implementing bodies, so intelligence means can also offer valuable information. The implementation of a complex multilateral agreement, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, will definitely benefit from intelligence and other informational sources. In some instances, the findings of implementing bodies such as the OPCW may be useful in targeting information gathering; in other cases, the findings could be critical in directing specific information gathering.

*Data Exchanges/Registers and Notifications/Declarations*

There are a few opportunities for synergies between notifications and data exchanges. While notifications are not dependent upon data exchanges, data exchanges may get some help from notifications. However, they are essentially two independent methods with separate purposes.

*Data/Information Exchanges and Inspections/Observations*

Data exchanges and inspections are mutually reinforcing in many different ways. Data exchanges can pinpoint locations that can be targeted for inspections; inspections can confirm data provided in the exchanges or detect inconsistencies. Information exchanged under a global cut-off agreement will provide valuable information for inspecting parties and, in turn, data acquired by inspectors will be useful in confirming or detecting anomalies in the information provided under data exchanges.

*Data/Information Exchanges and Aerial Surveillance*

Aerial surveillance will benefit from information provided under data exchanges. Data exchanges will obtain limited benefits from aerial inspections. The synergistic effects will consist primarily of confirming information.

