

I Purpose and Scope of the Study

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The end of the Cold War has signalled a new era in arms control. East-West confrontation is over, cooperation has begun, and the questions remaining center around how quickly steps can be taken to reverse the nuclear buildup, how to assure that excess nuclear weapons and materials do not find their way into rogue nations, how to eliminate a large stockpile of chemical weapons, and how to prevent the spread of conventional weapons to unstable regions of the world. While these are not small questions, the cooperative pursuit of solutions will make a significant contribution to the international efforts to constrain proliferation.

The end of the Gulf War presages a less fortunate future. It signals a period in which weapons of mass destruction and their advanced delivery systems are being developed indigenously or acquired by emerging weapons states in the Third World, stores of conventional weapons are being built up beyond the legitimate requirements of national defense, local disputes are spilling over into regional conflicts, and regional conflicts are threatening global stability and security. Constraining the proliferation of these weapons of mass impact, reducing regional confrontations, and encouraging reductions in military force levels will be major tasks ahead for Canada, the United States, and other members of the United Nations.

Future multilateral arms control agreements, export controls exercised by supplier groups and regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, reciprocal actions, and unilateral initiatives will play major roles in the many efforts which will be required in order to reduce, cut, control, and deal with the consequences of a rapid increase in weaponry: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and advanced conventional weapons and advanced delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and modern aircraft. Each of these approaches will require means for assuring compliance by all parties.

While many studies have evaluated specific verification methods, such as on-site inspection, little has been written about the multiplier

effects associated with verification synergies. This study argues that the combination of separate aspects of arms control verification produces an effect greater than that of the components taken separately, or to put in the most simple terms, the sum of verification is greater than its parts. The term, "synergies," as used in this paper encompasses the combinative effects between verification methods and techniques, between agreements or regimes, between implementing mechanisms and forums, between organizations and agencies within a country, between countries party to an agreement, and various combinations of these items. The resultant synergistic effects may be simultaneous or sequential.

This paper identifies many of these effects, using specific arms control examples where appropriate. It also provides a basis for taking these synergies into account during the process of formulating and evaluating the effectiveness of the verification regimes of particular agreements and actions. The paper considers three forms of verification: cooperative, adversarial, and coercive, as exemplified respectively by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq following the War in the Gulf.

Underlying this paper are the following premises. Arms control, in a variety of forms, will remain a fundamental approach to international security. Verification or some form of explicit and agreed-upon "confirmation" will be required for regimes and approaches aimed at constraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their advanced delivery systems. Finally, the need to constrain proliferation and to control and resolve regional conflicts will necessitate more adversarial verification regimes and coercive regimes, such as mandatory inspections and embargoes encompassed in resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

