

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

for examination to Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Considerable progress was also made in preparing proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities, though some questions relating to certain numerical parameters and terminology still need to be resolved. A useful discussion was held on permitted production and synthesis of Schedule I chemicals as well as on toxins. Finally, although no complete agreement has been reached as yet, we have made progress on a whole range of bilateral measures of confidence-building, openness and mutual inspection. These measures are to be implemented even before the future convention is signed. All in all, we are encouraged with the results of the round and hope that after some time they will have a favourable influence on the multilateral negotiations as well - the subject which I would now like to turn to.

We believe that by now the conditions are ripe for us to finish putting together the essential verification system. The basis for such a system is there - it is the combination of systematic and challenge inspections. Yet unresolved issues still remain in every area. We are convinced that challenge inspections without exemptions or the right of refusal, extending equally to any site or facility, be it military or civil, State-owned or private, are an essential element of the future verification system. We urge all those who have not yet done so to make an unequivocal statement that they accept the principle of such inspections. Should any members have specific difficulties, let them openly state where such difficulties lie.

We do not share the opinion which has sometimes been voiced here that challenge inspections are excessively confrontational. (By the way, I should like to ask whether it might not be as well for us to stop using the word "challenge" and say "request" instead.) At the same time we would be prepared to give an attentive look at the arguments of those delegations which believe they would be more comfortable if alongside the mechanism of challenge inspections the convention contained procedures which did not involve expressing suspicions about any State.

The proposal of the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections which could, as we understand it, be carried out at any site or facility could form a good basis for such an additional verification sub-system. True, we would prefer that quota limitations should only apply to the number of inspections which a State would be obliged to receive on its territory within a given period of time. The so-called active quota would not then be introduced. Otherwise, States would always have to be afraid of exhausting their quotas too quickly, and this in its turn could limit their real possibility of exercising the right of request. As for the passive quota, we believe it could amount to about five inspections per year. Provisions should also be worked out containing specific requirements for requests to make ad hoc inspections, namely, an indication of the location and the specific type of activity to be verified. This is necessary if such inspections are to be effective.