

significantly larger than the number of independent variables in the model if any valid inferences are to be drawn. Our review of cases of immediate extended deterrence in this century suggests that this essential requirement has not been met. Thus far, the small number of cases of deterrence successes identified effectively precludes this kind of analysis as a valid method of theory testing.<sup>166</sup>

Most quantitative testing assumes either a sample drawn from an identified universe, or analysis of the universe itself. For reasons we have already made clear, neither approach is feasible in the analysis of deterrence. The inability to identify the universe of cases or construct a representative sample has troubling consequences. Among the most important advantages of causal and correlational analyses across cases is the ability to generalize with reasonable confidence in the validity of the inferences that are drawn. In the absence of a properly drawn sample or a universe of cases, the validity of inferences is subject to the same kinds of limitations characteristic of small numbers of detailed case studies.

Aggregation across cases also washes out much of the impact of perceptual and decision making variables on the outcome of deterrence. In the testing of some theories, it can be argued that these kinds of variables are neither theoretically important nor empirically justified; their inclusion in a model adds little to the proportion of variance that is explained. This proposition cannot be sustained with respect to deterrence theory. As we have argued, theories of deterrence are, at their core, psychological theories; they are built on assumptions about the way leaders think under specified conditions.<sup>167</sup> These assumptions must be interpreted through auxiliary assumptions which, in turn, must be measured through indicators that tap leaders' beliefs, estimates, and judgments.

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<sup>166</sup> See Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," for a detailed examination of the data set of extended immediate deterrence in this century compiled by Huth and Russett. Ten cases, the number of cases of immediate extended deterrence we find in the data set, is far too small to permit the valid testing of a causal model across cases.

<sup>167</sup> See Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter."