

defence debate both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer wanted the Government to opt out of the Sage-Bomarc operation, but maintain the warning and detection functions of NORAD.⁸ According to the Canadian Annual Review for 1960 the Liberals were "prepared to tolerate NORAD...for the time being,"⁹ but obviously the parliamentary party was suggesting a decreased commitment to a passive defence role. This was confirmed at the plenary sessions of the National Liberal Party in 1961 when a resolution was adopted "to withdraw from NORAD in so far as the present interceptor role is concerned," but at the same time "provide for an appropriate Canadian contribution" in the form of passive defence. Apparently this was a compromise resolution which fell "short of the outright withdrawal favoured by some delegates."¹⁰

The Liberal attitude was reinforced by the increasing debate over the acquisition of nuclear warheads, and by 1962 "the nuclear arms issue monopolized the discussion of defence."¹¹ The nuclear issue also ensured that the NDP would continue to reject the agreement, and the following statement was used as a platform plank during the 1962 general election; "NORAD was intended to meet the threat of the manned bomber; with the development of missiles, it is obsolete. Furthermore, there is every danger that the Bomarcs will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The NORAD agreements should therefore be terminated."¹² The Conservatives, on the other hand, refused to equip either the Bomarcs or the Voodoos with nuclear warheads, but still maintained Canada could perform a useful role in both the passive and active defence roles.

While the election of 1962 did not bring the NORAD question (or the nuclear issue) into focus, the Cuban crisis convinced some Canadians that the response of the Government "had been hesitant, uncertain, and inglorious." Furthermore, there was the impression that Canada did not live up to her NORAD commitment despite the denial of the Defence Minister. Unfortunately, the Conservative case was not helped when the Minister of External Affairs declared that NORAD was part of NATO and consequently not involved in the Cuban crisis.¹³ Despite the Cuban crisis and the reversal of the Liberal stand on the nuclear issue, the Conservatives went into the election of 1963 without clarifying the Canadian role in NORAD. It is apparent that the party had no desire to relegate the Canadian role to one of passive defence, but at the same time would not supply warheads for the weapons systems so they could function with maximum effectiveness.

With Mr. Pearson's Scarboro speech in January, 1963 the nuclear deadlock was broken and on the question of continental defence the Liberal leader said it was necessary "to take whatever steps are feasible for the protection of our territory; through suitable measures for passive, as well as active defence."

After the election of a Liberal administration in 1963 the new Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, in an appearance before the newly formed Special Committee on National Defence, supported an active role for Canada since "the bomber threat" remained "a very larger