

the French sent down amongst them seven fire ships, which would have inflicted much damage, materially obstructed operations, and might have led to the raising of the siege but for the cowardice or folly of the officers in command, who abandoned them before they got well under fire, first firing the trains, which were connected with the artillery, with which each vessel was armed, and, as this produced a random bombardment, it also gave notice of what was intended, thus enabling the English sailors to tow them all aground, where they burned to the water's edge without doing any damage to the fleet. On the 29th, the British under Brigadier General Monckton occupied Point Levis for the purpose of pushing forward the works necessary to open fire on the city, and at the same time the west point of the Island of Orleans was occupied by Colonel Carleton for a similar purpose.

The works being in a state of forwardness the army crossed the North Channel, and encamped near the enemy's left, the river Montmorenci being between them. Montcalm, aware that the moment the batteries on Point Levis were completed, the works of defence by which the right of his army was covered, including the city, would suffer considerable damage, and might probably be rendered untenable, or so thoroughly disabled as to afford a chance for an effective judgment being made thereon, resolved to retard, and, if possible, prevent their completion. In accordance with this resolution he detached Dumas with 1,500 men on the night of the 12th of July; they landed at the mouth of the Chaudiere and prepared to march on the batteries, some of them having already opened fire. In the darkness one column of his troops mistook the other for the enemy and fired upon them, the fire was returned, and the whole body retreated in confusion. The subsequent bombardment entirely destroyed the Lower Town, and reduced the buildings in the Upper Town to heaps of ruins, obliging the citizens to seek safety in flight. Meanwhile as the habitants declined to accept the terms proposed in the manifesto, and as they stubbornly adhered to their allegiance, defending their homesteads against the invaders, parties of Rangers were detached to scour the country and lay it waste with fire and sword; a mission which those unscrupulous savages fulfilled to the uttermost, destroying the plantations from Malbair on the North, and Riviere du Loup on the South Shore to Quebec.

An episode in this miserable warfare deserves notice. Captain Richard Montgomery, with a detachment of three hundred men, having been sent to enforce neutrality at St. Joachim, the people remaining in that village stood on their defence, headed by their Cure, the Revd. M. de Portneuf; after a smart and sanguinary action they were defeated, the gallant priest, like a true soldier of the church militant, fell bravely sword in hand, in defence of the flock he ministered to; the village was burned and the survivors put to the sword in cold blood. The officer commanding the detachment charged with this butchery was General Montgomery, who fell leading an attack of the revolted subjects of the King he served so well, on the city of Quebec on the night of December the 31st, 1775, and there can be no doubt but his conduct at St. Joachim had a natural effect on the stern resistance offered to his attack on the latter occasion by the compatriots of the people so foully outraged. During the progress of the bombardment the vigilance of Wolfe was excessive, every point from the Montmo-

renci to Capo Rouge was carefully and minutely reconnoitred, in the hope that some unguarded point might be found on which to land, and force his opponent to place the fate of the city on the result of a general action, but all in vain, no such advantage was available. On the night of the 18th of July the *Sutherland* and *Squirrel*, frigates, with several sloops, succeeded in passing the city uninjured by the guns, thus cutting off the communication by water with Montreal, and inflicting a severe blow on Montcalm's troops. At the same time Brigadier General Carleton landed with a body of troops at Point aux Trembles for the purpose of destroying magazines and capturing prisoners for intelligence; in the first object they were unsuccessful, for the reason there were no magazines to capture, in the latter, more successful, but it was found impossible to march a sufficient body of troops through the woods to assail the rear of Montcalm's position. As any attempt on the right or centre of the French lines was impossible, Wolfe determined to cross the Montmorenci in force and endeavor to turn their left, while a powerful diversion was attempted in its front. As the depth of water on the mud flat or batteries extending from the St. Charles to the Montmorenci was too small to admit of vessels of any draft of water approaching sufficiently near to cover the landing of troops, two transports of light draft were armed and prepared to take the ground easily on the fall of the tide to cover the disembarkation and annoy the entrenchments with their fire. While those arrangements were in course of preparation Montcalm made a second attempt to burn the English fleet, by sending down, on the night of the 28th of July, a formidable fire raft, composed of schooners, barges and other vessels chained together, measuring six hundred feet in length and loaded with grenades, shells, swivels, and guns loaded to the muzzle with every description of combustible, but it was at once towed ashore by the fearless sailors.

The Montmorenci river is one succession of cascades from its source in the Lac des Neiges till its final jump from a height of two hundred and fifty feet into the St. Lawrence; and, as the French had jealously guarded all passable fords above, it only remained to cross at its mouth where it was fordable at low water. The English camp occupied by the brigades of Generals Townshend and Murray, commanded the French lines, but at too great a distance for effective artillery fire; it was at length determined to try the effect of an attack on their extreme left. Having mounted his batteries on the left bank of the Montmorenci, with sixty pieces of artillery, and placing the transports already noticed, a little above the mouth of the Montmorenci, each armed with fourteen guns, the *Centurion*, Alston's famous ship, then armed with fifty guns, was placed in the mouth of the river to protect the ford and silence the guns of the French battery on the extreme left; there was thus over one hundred pieces of artillery ready to support the attack designed to force the lines. The transports commanded the road leading to Courville, opposite and leading to the heights occupied by the French reserve, and also covered the upper end of the ford; from the Beauport heights the ground descends towards the St. Lawrence, in terraces on the lower of which, between the Courville road and the Montmorenci river, a strong Redoubt had been constructed. Wolfe's first idea appears to have been directed to the

capture of this work as the necessary step towards an attack on the covering lines; but being on board the first armed transport which ran furthest in before taking ground, he became aware of the fact that it was commanded by the works in the rear, and this circumstance caused a certain degree of hesitation in the after movements, which operated heavily against their success. Early in the forenoon of the 31st of July, the armed transports intended for the attack were moored in their stations under a heavy fire from the French batteries, to which the English artillery replied with crushing effect. The *Centurion*, also anchored in her appointed position, while the boats of the fleet filled with Grenadiers and a part of Monckton's brigade, moved from Point Levis in time to take advantage of the low tide to land in concert with Townshend's and Murray's brigade. About 1 p. m., the latter brigades moved from their encampment at L'Ange Gatheux, while a detachment marched up the left bank of the Montmorenci about three miles, for the purpose of crossing the stream and assailing the rear of the left of the French lines. All the arrangements were admirably made in perfect order, but the boats delayed till the turn of the tide grounded on the ledges off the mouth of the Montmorenci, by which much valuable time was lost. At length a landing was effected by 1,200 grenadiers, but Monckton's detachment was still at a distance, and Townshend had not effected a junction, his advance being arrested by Wolfe's orders, till the Grenadiers would be ready to land. Meantime the column detached for the attack of the left rear of the French line, were defeated by Mons. de Repentigny, with some loss, and its retreat enabled him to send the reinforcements he had received in the morning to the point now threatened. The Grenadiers were ordered to be formed in four columns of attack immediately on landing, to be supported by Monckton's troops and Townshend's command, but not to move forward till the latter had crossed the ford. Instead of obeying those orders, they had no sooner touched ground than they rushed towards the Redoubt in the utmost disorder. The French abandoned this work on their approach and fell back on the shelter of their lines, on which the British still advanced, and were allowed to close within a few yards distance when they were received with a deadly fire, which at once checked their impetuosity, and, finally after considerable loss, obliged them to fall back behind the Redoubt for shelter; here they remained for some time unable to reform, from the severe fire directed against them, they finally retreated and formed in rear of Monckton and Townshend's troops, which had formed a junction on the beach.

A severe thunderstorm suspended operations, and it was deemed advisable not to risk a second repulse, as the retreat of Townshend's corps would be cut off by the rising tide and darkness, the troops were accordingly withdrawn, after a loss of 500 in killed and wounded, many of the latter were left on the field—the armed transports were burned. This attack was made at the only practicable point in the whole of the French lines. The chief cause of failure was the small detachment sent against the left rear, and Wolfe's uncertainty, after discovering that the French Redoubt was useless as a point of advantage. The repulse of the Grenadiers was a mere bagatelle, which could easily be retrieved, and doubtless would have been if the General's caution was not more than a match for