tercourse with others, sometimes for the sake of some benefit to be obtained, but sometimes, too, from the moral necessity and craving which are apparent from the very habits of mankind.

"On this account, therefore, a law is required by which States may be rightly directed and regulated in this kind of intercourse with one another. And although to a great extent this may be supplied by the natural law, still not adequately nor directly, and so it has come about that the usages of States have themselves led to the establishment of special rules. For, just as within an individual State custom gives rise to law, so for the human race as a whole, usages have led to the growth of the laws of nations; and this the more easily, inasmuch as the matters with which such law deals are few and are closely connected with the law of nature, from which they may be deduced by inferences which, though not strictly necessary, so as to constitute laws of absolute moral obligation, still are very conformable and agreeable to nature, and therefore readily accepted by all."

Nor ought we to overlook the work of a writer even earlier than these. I mean Franciscus à victoria. Hall says of him that his writings in 1533 mark an era in the history of international ethics. Spain claimed, largely by virtue of Papal grant and warrant, to acquire the territory and the mastery of the semi-civilized races of America. He denied the validity of the Papal title; he maintained the sovereign rights of the aboriginal races, and he claimed to place international relations upon the basis of equal rights as between communities in actual possession of independence. In other words, he, first, clearly affirmed, the juridical principle of the complete international equality of independent states, however disproportionate their power.

Grotius undoubtedly had had the field of international relations explored by these, amongst other writers who had preceded him, but to him is certainly due the credit of evolving in his "*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*" a coherent system of law for the aggregation of states.

But I turn from this interesting line of thought, to consider, first, the part played by the United States in shaping the modern tendencies of international law, and, next, whither those tendencies run. I have already spoken of the international writers of whom you are justly proud. It is not too much to say that the undoubted stream of tendency in modern international law to mitigate the horrors of war, to humanize or to make less inhuman its methods, and to narrow the area of its consequential evils, is largely due to the policy of your statesmen and the moral influence of your jurists.

The reason why you thus early in your young history as an independent power took so leading and noble a part in the domain of international law is not far to seek;—it is at once obvious and interesting.

In the first place, you were born late, in the life of the world, into the family of nations. The common law of England you had indeed imported and adopted as colonists in some of the States, but subject as you then were to the mother country, you had no direct interest or voice in inter-