

of a battle that will not last more than a few days. Rapidly constructed trenches are very embarrassing to cavalry, and so also is wire thrown loosely on the ground.

It is hard to resist the conviction that the war is now in its last stages, and this in spite of the contrary views of some of the Allied commanders. But to view the problem from the military standpoint alone is to view only half of it. There are other factors that do not come at all within the purely military vision. First there is the Russian revolution, which promises not only a stiffening of the Russian fighting power, hitherto paralyzed by German court intrigues, but that also carries with it the deadly menace of contagion. Secondly, we have the hunger situation in Germany, and the shortage of copper, which cannot be hidden by official mendacities. And, thirdly, we have the imminence of American participation, which will be substantial enough even though it should be confined to money, motor boats and moral support. This is not the place to weigh these factors or to assess their effects. We can all of us do this for ourselves, and however moderate may be our calculations they will not conceal the desperate straits to which the Central Empires now find themselves reduced. None of the extravagant estimates on one side or the other can remove this unalterable conviction.

## Belloc Agrees With Coryn

It is interesting in this connection to observe Hilaire Belloc's forecast of the German's next move. One may conclude, he says (within the limits of uncertainty attaching to all war), that the Bapaume Ridge is of serious and even vital importance to the enemy as he is now situated, and that if he is compelled to abandon it, it will be the signal for an attack by him elsewhere.

For this sector—upon which, without the least doubt, he is suffering the initiative of his opponent and is being compelled against his will to a rather perilous retirement—though it is the sector covering his main communications and therefore one of high importance to him, is, after all, only one fragment of the long line between the sea and the mountains which he has to defend, and upon any point on which he can concentrate for his last offensive.

We know that such an offensive is contemplated, for the whole purport of every measure he has undertaken during the last two months must be its delivery—his refusal to come south in the Balkans, so far; the halt—imposed upon him, indeed, but accepted—upon the shortest line between the Bukovina and the Danube; the analogy of all his past action—would convince us; apart from ample other evidence which cannot, of its nature, be discussed.

The Prussian never invents; he first copies others and then himself; and this attachment to routine has not served him so badly in the last two hundred years that we can afford to ridicule it. It has very grave disadvantages, but it goes with the mass of highly detailed but slow preparation which is in his case synonymous with organization. The enemy has certainly concentrated for a last offensive, but where it may be delivered, even a conjecture as to its theatre, is obviously no matter of discussion.

The point for us to notice in connection with this problem of the Bapaume Ridge is that if upon that very important sector he finds himself embarrassed he will trust to the effect of his offensive elsewhere to deliver him. He has held these lines in the Artois strongly since the weather stopped the main battle, but not more strongly than was needed for mere defence, and if he has pared down his strength here to the limit of safety and has been compelled to successive losses of ground up to what is now obviously a danger point, he is the more obviously determining a chief blow elsewhere. It goes without saying that his power to deliver such a blow and to continue it is not untrammelled. He has a superior enemy before him who can forestall such a blow if he chooses, or allow it to be delivered first if he chooses, and the superiority of that initiative of the Allies will be clear enough in due time.

# FOREIGN FINGERS in OUR B.C. PIE

It used to be said before the war—and by military authorities, too—that, in case Canada was attacked from the Pacific side, our logical

obligation would be to ungrudgingly hie ourselves to the territory east of the Rocky Mountains and surrender the intervening country to the invaders—that intervening country being the whole of the Province of British Columbia. If conditions are allowed to remain after the war the same as they were before, the people who have believed in that somewhat drastic policy will be justified in continuing to do so.

It was common knowledge before the outbreak of hostilities that our Pacific Coast would be helpless in the event of attack, and while the mobilization of troops for the Canadian expeditionary forces, together with the partial renovation of some of the old-fashioned fortifications, has considerably altered the state of affairs since then, no one in a position to know the true situation will deny that British Columbia's future security rests in the establishment of much more powerful means of defence than it has been provided with in the past. For Canada without British Columbia would be like a man who had lost his right arm. To some Easterners that statement may seem like an exaggeration, but British Columbia's greatness has not yet been brought to the test. When a substantial start has been made in the development of the province's vast natural resources then will the people of Canada begin to appreciate its truth.

There is everything in British Columbia to make it eventually the Pennsylvania of Canada. With boundless resources of iron, coal, lumber, water-power and incalculable quantities of other raw materials, there is nothing lacking to make the province one of the greatest—if not the greatest—industrial communities in the Empire. The province's prosperity hinges on the degree to which her natural potentialities are developed, but the question does not end there.

In the past British Columbia has been a source of raw materials. She has given freely of her resources to supply the markets of the world. Her coal supplies the seaports of the Pacific Coast from Nome to San Francisco and further south. Her lumber is beginning to be known in every place where timber is used for construction purposes. Thousands of tons of copper have found their way to the United States. British Columbia salmon is a well known commodity as far away as England, and other products also find a ready demand overseas. If British Columbia is to go ahead on a permanent basis, however, instead of impoverishing herself by disposing of her natural resources in the

## Americans and Other Outsiders Seem to Appreciate Coast Opportunities Better than Canadian Capitalists

By CHARLES L. SHAW

raw state, she must provide herself with the facilities to carry on manufacturing in connection with those resources. She must be able to put the finished article on the market. In this way she can retain millions of dollars which in the past have gone to alien countries which have been in a position to make the most advantageous use of her raw produce.

An illuminating example of the case in point is furnished in the copper situation. British Columbia is one of the biggest copper-producing countries in the world. She has been shipping copper in the raw state to the United States for years, her output being naturally increased by the demands created by the war. Yet every ounce of ore had to be sent to the other side of the 49th parallel to be refined. There is not a single copper refinery in B. C., and only a few smelters. One of the latter was purchased a few days ago by a group of New York capitalists.

What is the result of all this? Simply this, that British Columbia has been losing tremendous profits right along, and that she has been absolutely dependent upon a foreign country for the development of her mines. As a consequence, the country has little or no control of the outlet of its copper. It is unquestionably a fact that Germany, at the outset of war, was in possession of large quantities of B. C. copper, which had gone to the United States to be refined and purchased there by German agents. Had British Columbia had her own refineries that copper could have been kept within the Empire.

The exact figures—were they obtainable—showing the proportion of alien and British capital invested in the metalliferous mines of British Columbia would surprise the majority. A prominent mining authority states that well over 70 per cent. of the capital is American, and that estimate is probably a conservative one, for it is steadily becoming more difficult to name off-hand the companies controlled by British money. British Columbia labourers and miners get the wages; the profits go over the line. That is the regrettable aspect of the province's present mining prosperity.

It is estimated that there are 40,225,000,000 tons of the best iron ore in British Columbia; these resources have hardly been touched yet. Some day the country will become a great steel manufacturing district. That "some day" will be when capital can be induced to invest, and it must be British capital

if we would have prosperity and development on a permanent basis.

It is claimed that there are 12,000 unworked, in fact, virgin-soil, Crown-

granted claims in B. C., many of them capable of being operated. They stand idle for want of capital. The zinc mines have had to rely almost entirely upon the smelters and refineries of the United States. Not only is that a bad condition from the Imperial standpoint, but it is a serious handicap to the mines being operated, as the American smelters take as much as 66 to 77 per cent. of the value of the zinc shipments for shipping and other charges. If the mines of British Columbia can make money under present conditions, is it not only just to suppose that their profits would increase manifold if the present difficulties were thrust aside by the substitution of British for American capital and the opening of the way thereby for the establishment of refineries and more smelters in the province? Capital is an essential for the development of any country, and if local capitalists cannot be persuaded to invest, it must come from elsewhere. Hence alien control of industries.

And right there lies the really crucial aspect of the whole question of the advancement of our Pacific Coast. Owing to the war there is naturally a general scarcity of ready money, but there also seems to be in most quarters a general lack of enterprise. Not that the people distrust the natural wealth of the country and do not realize that its development will mean benefit to everyone. The real fact appears to be this: The people of the West have suffered the misfortune of having in years gone by been able to make money too quickly. The effect of real estate booms on the sentiment of the people has been a great handicap and will continue to be so, unless something takes place to counteract it. The average Westerner, in prosperous times, will sooner invest his earnings in a piece of land for speculation than put it into a company for the development of the country's natural resources. There is lots of money in British Columbia, but the people who have it are holding back, waiting for dear knows what, because never in the country's history was there such an opportunity for the investor as at present. I know of a man who tried to get some B. C. capitalists interested in a proposition to make commercial use of the vast quantities of seaweed that grow along the coast. He proved that the undertaking was practical and found that there was a wonderful demand for his produce, yet he couldn't raise the money after months of trying. Another scheme was launched for deep sea fishing off the coast of B. C., and yet, while thousands of dollars are being made right now in the halibut business