

first step must be the collection of the rolling stock on the required points of the different lines. To take the readiest example, if an order were issued in London in the evening, this would be accomplished on any of our lines by daybreak next morning, to an extent that would ensure the despatch of trains thenceforward without interruption. But in fact a continuous movement might be commenced in about six hours with the stock collected in that interval.

This preliminary measure accomplished, the following conditions attach to the conveyance of troops of all arms:

A train of from twenty-four to thirty-four carriages of all kinds—passenger carriages, cattle-trucks, horse-boxes, and break-vans—can be propelled by one engine; and a speed of from twenty to twenty-five miles an hour, though lower than what is attainable, is considered more suitable to a continuous movement by lessening the risk of breaking down.

An ordinary second or third class carriage holds thirty-two soldiers. A horse-box holds three horses, and a cattle-truck six to eight. Taking the effective number of one of our infantry battalions at 760 men and 36 officers, and allowing three tons of baggage and four tons of camp equipage, the battalion, with its equipment, can be conveyed in one train.

One train will also contain a squadron of cavalry of 120 horses, and four trains the regiment.

Each artillery waggon, or gun, with its limber, occupies one truck. A battery of horse artillery, or a field battery, with its men, horses, and equipment complete, requires two trains of from thirty-one to thirty-three carriages each.

A battalion of infantry standing ready at the station, and properly practised, embarks in a few minutes. Cavalry require twenty-five minutes to fill the train, and artillery half an hour. If all embark at the same station, only three trains could be despatched in an hour. But by creating temporary platforms the loading can take place simultaneously. A platform 300 feet long allows all the carriages of a train to be loaded at once—and such a platform can be made in three hours, by 200 men, out of materials always at hand on railways.

Under such circumstances it has been calculated that there would be no difficulty in forwarding, on an English railway, large bodies of troops at the rate of one train every seven and a half minutes, or eight trains per hour—that being the shortest interval judged safe on such occasions. The transport of a corps of all arms might therefore be thus calculated in round numbers:

20,000 infantry.....	26 trains.
2,000 cavalry.....	16 "
8 batteries.....	16 "
First Reserve of ammunition....	8 "
4 companies of engineers.....	4 "
Ambulance.....	2 "
Total.....	72 trains.

Supposing the carriages collected and the platforms made for embarking and disembarking, the corps could be conveyed sixty miles in twelve hours from the commencement of the movement. If it were required to operate in a district which could not be relied on to furnish food and conveyance, it must be followed by one day's provisions and forage filling eight trains, and transport vehicles and animals filling eight more. The whole movement would be complete in fourteen to sixteen hours.

This amount of force might be despatched on our chief railways without aid from the return carriages. Other bodies might also follow to the distance named, or even farther, since the carriages would return in

time to maintain the continuity of the movement. But if the distance were doubled the operation must be interrupted.

This calculation rests on data afforded by double lines conducting a great traffic, and possessing the maximum amount of officials, servants, and rolling stock. Such facilities would exist only in an inferior degree in many parts of the continent, or in America. The power of maintaining the movement of large bodies must also in most cases be diminished by the necessity of conveying to supply the great towns which depend on railways for food and fuel. Other drawbacks must also be taken into account in estimating the speed of movements by rail. On long journeys intervals of rest are necessary. Men and horses are exhausted by the constrained position, packed closely as they must be, and could scarcely be at once ready to march after travelling a great distance without a halt.

The modifications which railways may be expected to cause in military operations, will be noticed as occasions arise in future chapters.

(To be continued.)

The following letter is said to be from the pen of the Hon. L. Hoiton and does credit to the statesmanlike abilities of that distinguished gentleman. It is unmistakably the opinion of the Canadian people, as a whole, with the exception of the few individuals for whose benefit it has been published, and it puts that feeling and sentiment in the most concise as well as effective form:

To the Editor of the Montreal Herald:

SIR.—It may well be doubted whether the gentlemen who have taken the grave responsibility of engaging in the public advocacy of Independence, as a desirable and easily attainable measure, have formed any adequate conception of the magnitude of the revolution they are inviting us to consider, or of the nature of the difficulties that lie in the way of its accomplishment.

Their scheme involves the dismemberment of a great empire, never so powerful physically, nor so influential morally, and consequently never so well qualified to fulfil all the requirements of its commanding position among the powers of the earth, as at this moment. It involves, moreover, a change of sovereignty over three millions of square miles of territory, and a change of allegiance by four millions of people in the full enjoyment of free institutions under which they have achieved an enviable degree of material prosperity. This is *revolution*—a revolution thorough, comprehensive, far-reaching. Do any of the ordinary incitements to revolution exist in our case? If not, on what ground of right reason or of sound morals is the movement to be justified, and what prospect is there of its being sustained by a majority or any considerable portion of our people?

If England sought to abridge our political rights, or, fallen from her high estate, she were either unable or unwilling to discharge her duty as the leading member of the vast Confederacy of States composing the British Empire; or if, from circumstances equally beyond her control and ours, the connection, hitherto so advantageous to us, should become burdensome, crippling our resources and retarding our progress, then unquestionably there would be valid grounds for seeking a severance of the tie that binds us to her. But so long as none of these conditions exist or appear likely to arise in the

near future, any attempt to shake the sentiment of the people of this country in favor of British connection, will prove utterly futile, and can only end in the disappointment and humiliation of its authors.

But it will perhaps be said, as it has been already said, England has failed—is now failing to perform her duty to us by her conduct respecting the Fenian raids, and by withdrawing her troops from Canada, in virtue of a policy she has deliberately adopted towards all the Colonies to whom responsible Government has been conceded. With respect to the Fenian raids, we have shown that we can deal with them successfully ourselves, and the moral effect of that now well established fact may be taken as partial, perhaps as ample, compensation for the cost and annoyance occasioned by those wicked and lawless incursions. Admitting freely what is constantly alleged, that Fenianism is an Imperial not a Canadian difficulty, that the enmity of the Fenians is to the British Empire, and not specifically to Canada, but assuming that Canada desires to remain a portion of that empire, can it be pretended that she has so far been called upon to bear an undue proportion of the burden of maintaining and defending the integrity of the empire? We possess and assert all the rights of local and self government so completely that the Imperial Government cannot influence the appointment nor stay the removal of the humblest official in Canada. Freedom, to be of any value must be founded on self reliance. It is childish to assert your manhood to day, and plead the privileges of babyhood to morrow and we indulge in just that kind of childishness when we complain of the withdrawal of the troops in time of peace. In the event of a foreign war, it must of course be assumed that the whole power of the Empire would be directed to the point in danger. When that trust fails us, we shall have just cause of complaint, but not till then.

There is no reason to suppose that a demand for Independence, if it proceeded from a majority of the people of these Provinces, would be resisted by England. On the contrary, the uniform utterance of her leading public men, during the past quarter of a century, justify the belief that it would be freely accorded. The main difficulty, therefore, with the advocates of immediate independence will be to obtain the suffrages of a majority of their own country. The difficulty, in the present state of facts, they will find insuperable. They have wholly misjudged the depth of British feeling and the strength of the attachment to the British name which prevades the country. Even if the conditions of the problem should be changed by causes not now visible, or by events not now anticipated, their present movement will have been none the less a blunder, and public men are not permitted to blunder with impunity on a question so momentous as the national life.

That independence will come in the fullness of time few, perhaps, will be inclined to deny; but the fullness of time is a long way off unless its approach be accelerated by events which all would deplore. Meanwhile there is ample scope for all our energies in so using the advantages of our present position as to fit our country for the higher duties that await her in the future.

ANGLO-CANADIAN.

July 5th, 1870.

The following are the resolutions adopted at the Public meeting in Montreal on Saturday 25th ult., and at which a futile attempt was made to create a feeling or expression