

some of our most eminent statesmen,¹ have not disclosed their mind. But I suppose that they consider, and, one must confess, not without right, that Rumania has no interest in seeing Russia completely successful. If Germany and Austria win, Russia will nevertheless remain a serious opponent of any effort Austria may make to bring under her domination parts of Rumania or of some Balkan state. But if the Allies win, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will no doubt be dismembered, and Rumania will find herself in the not very enviable position of being tenderly squashed between the palm of the Slav and the fingers of the Magyar.

But further than this, one of the chief aims of Russian policy has always been the possession of the Dardanelles. Russia never was as near to its realization as she is now, when the Turkish Empire is a thing of the past, and when she has England as an ally, England who has always barred her way to the Golden Horn. Russia in Constantinople, however, means the economic strangulation of Rumania. Bulgaria has an outlet to the Aegean Sea, Serbia will no doubt have one to the Adriatic, Rumania depends entirely upon the Dardanelles. Her splendid position at the mouth of the Danube, her possessions on the Black Sea, will be of little worth with the mighty Empire of the Tsar dominating the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, and the Straits. Not only is the cheap waterway an absolute necessity for the bulky products, corn, petroleum, timber, which form the chief exports of Rumania; but these also form the chief exports of Russia, who, by a stroke of the pen, may rule Rumania completely out of competition.

¹ e. g. M. P. Carp, M. A. Marghiloman, and others are for neutrality, whereas M. N. Filipescu, another prominent Conservative, is, together with M. T. Jonescu, the chief advocate of military action.