

believing that the troops of the United Nation would not go to the border of Manchuria, would not go to the Yalu river and thereby precipitate the situation in which we have found ourselves. In other words, I would be inclined to argue, if there was this tacit admission of the right to go ahead, there was also the tacit realization by a great number of the nations that we should go ahead only a certain number of miles and then stop. Unfortunately the United States saw fit to refuse the advice of colleagues and allies, which was offered in all sincerity. By doing that they may have altered the whole course of history. One of the things which some of us fear is that America's allies may be immolated on the altar of a policy which is a weird mixture of good intentions, the China lobby, offended pride, *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune* and the desires of presidential aspirants. These things form a bad basis on which to build a policy. Perhaps the United Nations has also been weak. We can learn and profit from what has happened. To my mind it is obvious that there has not been enough civilian control over the commander in chief of the allied forces; and as far as strategy goes I will always insist that the last word be left with the civilians. There was the mistake, despite the decision of the United Nations, of allowing Syngman Rhee back into North Korea. There was the mistake in giving Syngman Rhee sufficient power so that he could carry on mass executions of those with whom he disagreed and whom he called traitors. These efforts by Syngman Rhee are not the basis on which to build up the friendship which we desire to see between Asia and ourselves.

If as a result of the passing of this resolution the Chinese people's government still decide to go ahead, to negotiate, to have a cease-fire, to settle outstanding problems, none will be happier than I to find that my doubts are unfounded and that my fears are unrealized. But I share the fears of Sir Benegal Rau, namely, that the Chinese will accept this rebuff, as it is for all practical purposes, and decide not to negotiate further. In that case, what do we do? Again I come back to the logic of events. The United Nations has declared that China is an aggressor. No matter in what watered-down form, the declaration is there. The United Nations has declared that China is an outlaw. Outlaws must be punished. Otherwise we lose respect for law and order. What punishment do we administer? Collectively we administer punishment by means of economic sanctions. As the minister pointed out today, following upon economic sanctions there is the gravest danger that war may arise. Suppose, as a

result of economic sanctions—if we go as far as that—Mao decides to retaliate in Formosa, what then does the United States do? Suppose, as a result of sanctions, Mao decides to retaliate on Hong Kong, what does the United Kingdom do? Suppose as a result of economic sanctions Mao decides to retaliate in Viet Nam, what do the French do? What do we do as a member of the United Nations? These things which I fear may conceivably be part of the logic of events.

There are groups in Canada which have been often more fervent even than the State department in their advocacy of moral condemnation of China. One of the groups concerned is in Winnipeg, an organization known as the *Free Press*, which I have followed with a certain interest through the years. The *Free Press* clings frequently to its moral principles, but I rather think that it regards them much as others regard their dentures, to be taken out, admired, washed and then replaced. The *Free Press* insists that China must be declared an aggressor, and anyone who disagrees with this point of view is automatically an appeaser à la Munich. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) answered them quite adequately today. He answered them also in that speech of his on January 26, when he said concerning Munich:

The tragedy was in what was done there, and our statement of principles did not, I think, recommend doing anything that meant the betrayal of a people or a principle, nor was it a weak surrender to armed pressure or a naive misunderstanding of a political situation or of the dangers ahead if it were handled the wrong way.

The *Free Press* today does not appreciate the fact that the voice of a diplomat is only as loud as the calibre and the number of the guns behind him. Again I refer to the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs because there is so much in it with which I agree. He said:

The second draft resolution, proposed by the United States of America, finds that the people's government of China has engaged in aggression in Korea. If this resolution is pressed to a vote without further consideration of other measures, delegations will have to take a decision in regard to it, and that decision is not as easy or as simple for my delegation as it seems to be for some other delegations around this table.

Then he goes on:

It may be right and necessary to pass a moral judgment on the aggressor, even if there exists a situation such as the possibility of another and far more dangerous aggressor which may affect the enforcement of that judgment; it may be right and necessary to do that providing we recognize the circumstances and state the position accordingly. That course is honest and straightforward. But we have, I think, on the other hand, no right to pass