

condition from the same point of vantage. You have your basis for judgment and we have ours, and certainly no American government should expect or even wish Canada to provide a sedulous echo for American policy.

You have a view of proper behaviour toward mainland China that differs from the official policy of the United States. Yet many Americans would agree with you, rather than with our own official formulation. You have doubts about Viet Nam, but then so do many Americans. You questioned our use of force in the Dominican Republic. . . .”

M. Claude Ryan, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of Canadian foreign policy stated:

“Often, the Canadian understanding of international events has been more realistic, in the long term, than has been that of the U.S. With regard to the cold war, for instance, I think we saw, before the U.S.A. that the world was emerging from the period and coming into a period when we would have to start reestablishing contacts. With regard to Cuba, I think that Canada, on the whole has had a more understanding attitude, earlier than the U.S.A., and I think this is because we are not directly involved. This is an interesting asset. . . .

Time may help us and it is only after we have reestablished a certain equilibrium in our general economic position that we can have a truly adult foreign policy that is vigorous, positive and constructive, but if need be, distinct, indeed differentiated, from the policy of the United States.”

Witnesses with experience in the United States have assured the Committee that from the perspective of Washington, Canada is considered to follow a very independent foreign policy. Canada has not adopted or followed United States policy in relation to Cuba or in relation to Viet Nam and South East Asia. More recently, Canada has taken independent action in its negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China and in reducing and changing the nature of its NATO commitments as well as in other matters.

In the course of this hearing and its hearings on NATO and NORAD, the widest possible range of options with respect to military policies was presented to the Committee, ranging from more active participation in the NATO and NORAD alliances to a position of complete neutrality or non-alignment where Canada might be, in the words of John Holmes:

“. . . the neutral area between the superpowers on which might be installed the devices of inspection or detection pointed in both directions on which a strategic arms limitation agreement might be based”.

While Canada has elected recently to continue in both the NATO and NORAD alliances, it has done so voluntarily because it felt this to be in its best interests; it has in fact changed its military commitments and it has reserved the right to keep its options open for the future.

The Committee is convinced that despite the close military, economic and cultural relations between the countries, Canada is not a satellite of the United States and continues to have the power to adopt policies which are independent of the United States. In the words of Mr. Holmes to the Committee:

“. . . we can be as independent as we dare, but the United States itself is not likely to specify the bounds. . . . We can be super-circumscribed by our own timidity, but it is primarily our own calculation of our various