may be screened to an international committee. Reference to the International Court is provided for in article 9, and an effort is made in article 10 to cope with the problem of enforcement.

A few of the provisions in one document are not found in the other document. For example, the oath of impartiality in article 7 of the Ghana proposal, and the dispute-settlement provision in article 9 of the same document, find no precise counterpart in the Philippine draft. There are, additionally, differences in detail and in nuance, as is to be expected. The Philippines prefer one committee rather than two; and they would allow the reports to go to non-signatories, whereas Ghana would not. And so forth.

Both documents have a good deal in common and it is obvious that both provide us with exceptionally valuable bases for discussion. There major point of contact, of course, is the recognition of reports, conciliation, and petitions.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, it is a fact, I believe, that there is nothing terribly new or revolutionary in either of the two proposals. Reports, conciliation, and petitions are familiar techniques in the experience of international organizations generally and in the human rights field particularly. They have been used by a number of organizations in a variety of ways, and they have been talked about in the Human Rights Commission for at least 15 years. What is rather new, however, is that we now have a fresh opportunity to give these old ideas practical application in the sensitive field of race relations.