the scope and responsibilities of the GATT and the World Bank.[29] Examples abound from other states as well. The Chilean (and perhaps South American) preference for bilateralism in foreign affairs throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s was an extension of the pattern of rule established by the military government.[30] The Canadian commitment to multilateral institutions and to measures to enhance the apparatus of "international peace and security," or its repeated attempt to act as an "honest broker" between competing claims reflects not only Canada's relative international power position, but its domestic political tradition, with its emphasis on pragmatic non-ideological compromise, pluralism and accommodation, and "peace, order and good government."[31]

It is not easy to trace these links between domestic and international political praxis, but by narrowing the focus of "political culture" to these two elements — the impact of domestic political institutions and structures, and the outward projection of domestic political traditions and arrangements — one can at least gain a better grasp of the possible influences on policy and behaviour in the multilateral security arena.

Strategic Culture

The literature on "strategic culture" draws upon the tradition of political culture, but turns it towards a specific set of issues concerning war and the military. The most narrow (and classic) descriptions define it as "set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."[32] Somewhat more broadly, Desmond Ball has argued that:

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[29] Anne-Marie Burley, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State," in John Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 125-156; John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 195-232.

[30] Roberto Duran, "Chilean Multilateralism and the United Nations System," in Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight, eds., *State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995), 173.

[31] As Thomas Hockin notes, Canada's "tendency to put organization viability before purposes of organizations, our penchant to put ambiguity and peacekeeping in place of clear declaratory policy, [our] naive faith in the magic of negotiations: all these behaviour patterns flow genuinely from our domestic experience." Thomas Hockin, "Federalist Style in International Politics," in Stephen Clarkson, ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 129. See also Dennis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 15:4 (December 1982), 667-690. John Meisel, "The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Culture in a Post-Meech, Post-Cold War, Canada," paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, March 1991.

[32] Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 10:2 (January-March 1991), 5. As Stephen Peter Rosen put it, strategic culture argued that the beliefs and assumptions of political-military decision makers "framed their choices about international military behavior, in particular the choices concerning decisions to go to war; preferences for offensive, expansionist, or defensive modes of warfare; and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable." Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 17.