

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

equipment, are particularly suitable for the production of relevant very toxic chemicals. We also think that the routine inspection régime should permit inspectors to carry out checks in other sections of the plant visited, in particular to ensure that the declared chemicals are not being used for the production of chemical warfare agents in those sections of the plant that are not the primary target of the inspection.

This year the Committee also paid attention to the question of sanctions, or punitive measures, where it is demonstrated that a State party has not fulfilled its obligations under the convention. It is clear that the prospect of being branded as a violator will in itself provide a deterrence. But, as recent history has shown, resolutions to that effect, such as those adopted by the Security Council, may not be sufficient. Therefore, deterrence should be strengthened by creating a credible risk that in such situations clear language will be spoken and punitive measures indeed taken. Such punitive measures may be the outcome of a decision by the Executive Council. In particular, in the case of very serious violations of the convention, specific measures must be taken, including the suspension of all rights of membership and export control measures.

However, we should frankly face the fact that a foolproof guarantee that the deterrence will be credible enough cannot be given, nor that the necessary punitive measures will follow once the ban has been violated. A summing up in the convention of possible types of action to be considered will be of limited value, as a decision by the Executive Council will at any rate be required. Therefore, the option should remain open that individual countries may take punitive actions, in case of serious violations of the main obligations.

A few words on the future Organization. We consider a discussion on the major outlines of the Organization, on some of its critical features, useful, indeed indispensable. But we believe it would be unwise to try to settle details that clearly fall within the competence of the Preparatory Committee and of the organs to be established under the convention. Generally speaking, some rules have to be worked out now in order to ensure the proper and effective functioning of the convention, but many details are better left for later. Otherwise, we may not see the wood for the trees, get unnecessarily entangled in bureaucratic brushwood and set in stone patterns that ought to be adaptable to unforeseen situations.

One of the issues that needs to be clarified concerns the character and scope of the tasks of the secretariat, both in the phase before the entry into force of the convention and immediately thereafter. This applies to inspectors as well, most of whom must be trained in advance. We should also assess the order of magnitude of the financial consequences of the future international machinery.

We are faced with the unique problem that conditions should be such as to permit the Organization to begin working in full swing right from the start. In the interim phase between the signature and the entry into force of the convention, a provisional core secretariat must be set up. We suggest that directly after the entry into force of the convention, inspection should focus on chemical weapons stocks and facilities rather than on the civilian industry.