

(Mr. Dubey, India)

developing self-reliant economic structures must be respected. Moreover, the verification regime which is ultimately agreed upon must be non-discriminatory in character and should be accessible to all States parties to the convention. Finally, we should be careful to ensure that the procedures for the verification of compliance remain fair to the civilian chemical industry and do not put an unnecessary burden on it.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

My purpose in speaking today is to introduce the Egyptian working paper which has been distributed as an official document under the symbol CD/408.

I do not believe that I need stress our eagerness to see the adoption of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our opinion, such a convention would be among the principal achievements of the Committee on Disarmament. However, for this achievement to become an effective reality, efforts should be made to ensure the global nature of the convention through the accession thereto of all the countries of the world, in order to save this and future generations from the threat of the potential use of such horrifying weapons and to bring about their final disappearance from the military arsenals of the world.

In our view, one of the main prerequisites in this connection is an undertaking by the States parties to work for the achievement of this objective and to act in a manner conducive thereto. Accordingly, the Egyptian working paper proposes that the convention should contain a provision indicating that the States parties undertake to respect the convention, promote its objectives, and observe its letter and spirit in their international relations.

Moreover, in the matter of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, readiness or reluctance to accede to it will be the result of reciprocal influences in the attitudes of States such that, if a particular State or group of States declines to accede to the convention, other States, which initially might have wished to become a party to it, will be disinclined to take such a step. Conversely, the accession of a particular State or group of States might encourage other States to follow their example.

States are most likely to be predisposed towards accession if they have faith in the credibility of the convention and are satisfied that its provisions are conducive to the furtherance of a common interest, namely, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and that their security would not be jeopardized as a result of their accession thereto.

In this connection, the provisions concerning verification and compliance assume particular importance. The greatest inducement for States to accede to the convention would be a feeling of confidence that the convention is capable