


# ARMS CONTROL DIGEST *By Jane Boulden*



## Chemical Weapons

■ At the NATO meeting of the Defence Planning Committee during the week of 22 May 1986, the American decision to resume production of chemical weapons was accepted as part of the NATO force goals. Congress had approved the weapons subject to acceptance by NATO. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway stated they would not accept the weapons on their territory even during a crisis. Germany agreed to accept them in a crisis provided they were not the only Alliance member to do so. Although Alliance members agreed that the United States should begin production of new binary weapon shells, the Communiqué issued after the meeting confirmed NATO resolve to continue to seek a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States continue to state that they want a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. Negotiations on such a ban are continuing at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

## Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva

■ Soviet negotiator Viktor Karpov outlined a new Soviet proposal on strategic nuclear arms at the 11 June plenary meeting in Geneva. Calling the proposal an interim option the Soviets suggested a limit of 8,000 on strategic nuclear "charges" and a ceiling of 1,600 on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) deployed on sub-

marines were included under the nuclear charges ceiling. US forward-based systems in Europe would be excluded from the ceilings but the Soviets proposed that these weapons be frozen at their present level.

On 29 May 1986 the Soviet Union tabled a new proposal on space arms in which the Soviets stated that they would agree to deep reductions in strategic offensive arms if the US would agree not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for 10-20 years.

In a letter to Gorbachev sent on 25 July, President Reagan outlined the American response to Soviet proposals. The letter is reported to suggest that the US was willing to delay deployment of SDI for 5-7 years during which time both sides would continue research on new technologies. At the end of the 5-7 year period either both sides would deploy defences or the United States would deploy on its own.

## SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)

■ On 27 May 1986, President Reagan stated that the United States would dismantle two Poseidon submarines. Although this decision kept the US within the limits of the SALT II Treaty, President Reagan also announced that the United States would make future decisions on strategic nuclear force deployments based on the nature of the

Soviet threat and not on the limits outlined in the SALT II Treaty.

The Soviet Union responded by stating that, once the US exceeded the SALT II limits, the Soviet Union would consider itself free of these limits as well as those of the 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and would make appropriate increases in its strategic forces in order to maintain a situation of parity. The USSR requested a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to discuss the SALT II Treaty. The session accomplished little of substance. The United States stated that, after the October session of the SCC, the United States would no longer be willing to discuss the SALT I and SALT II Treaties at the SCC and would discuss only the ABM Treaty.

## MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna)

■ The Soviet Union tabled a new proposal on 11 June 1986. The proposal calls for reductions of 25% in ground troops and tactical air forces in Europe over a period of ten years, with initial reductions of 150,000 troops in the first two years. In a new twist, the proposal also includes nuclear missiles with ranges under 600 miles. The proposal, also known as the second Budapest appeal, attempts to apply the reduction schedule to *all* troops and conventional weapons deployed by NATO and the Warsaw

Pact in Europe. Previously the talks had concentrated on troops and weapons stationed in specific states of each alliance.

## Comprehensive Test Ban

■ In mid-May the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing was extended by General Secretary Gorbachev until 6 August 1986, and on 18 August Mr. Gorbachev extended the moratorium again until 1 January 1987. Bilateral talks between the US and Soviet Union on testing issues began in Geneva on 25 July and ended on 31 July. The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear testing and the United States emphasized the need to improve verification methods for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Both sides agreed to meet again in September. As the result of an agreement reached between the privately-funded American Natural Resource Defence Council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, scientists have been permitted to set up seismic stations near Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union.

## Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

■ Delegates wanted to reach some form of agreement before the 19 September CSCE preparatory meeting in Vienna. Adjustments in positions have been made by both sides. The Soviet Union has accepted on-site and aerial inspections of troop formations from East Germany to the Urals and the United States has agreed to notify the Soviet Union if it sends a large number of troops to Europe. Negotiations continue over a non-aggression accord and over the number of on-site inspections allowed yearly.

### Early Warning

November	CSCE Review Conference
Undetermined	US/USSR Summit
December	Deployment of 131st B-52 Bomber equipped with cruise missiles, taking the US over the SALT II limits unless other systems are dismantled Deployment of first 10 MX missiles in Wyoming
January 1987	End of unilateral Soviet testing moratorium