

In the East-West context, confidence involves the mutual recognition of the premises of peaceful coexistence; the acceptance of the approximate parity of military capabilities; the readiness to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to maintain the military balance at progressively lower levels; and the mutual respect for the other side's broad security interests. ...

CBMs have specific functions to fulfill and may have great unexplored potential. However, CBMs in and of themselves cannot be expected to solve pressing security and arms limitation problems."⁴⁰

The Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-Building Measures, a document submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, is a lengthy examination of the CBM concept. The understanding of Confidence Building developed in this report was produced through the use of a *functional* approach. Rather than wrestle with *a priori* characterizations, the authors of this study developed a flexible (if lengthy) understanding of the CBM concept by exploring the different *objectives* which CBMs should or ought to attain. According to the Report:

"Confidence-building should facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations, including verification; facilitate the settlement of international disputes and conflicts; ...

[O]ne of the main objectives of confidence-building measures must be to reduce the elements of fear and speculation in order to achieve a more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, which may cause mutual apprehensions and increase the risk of conflict.

All agreed that besides facilitating the dissemination and exchange of pertinent information, regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making should be encouraged and promoted... .

Confidence-building measures may serve the additional objectives of facilitating verification of arms control and disarmament. ... Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an inseparable part of arms control and disarmament measures. ...

Fear and insecurity resulting from important routine military activities can be allayed considerably if States agree to enlarge the scope and the area of application of confidence-building measures, which should be undertaken in such a manner as to indicate as reliably as possible their peaceful intentions. Any major deviation from agreed parameters of confidence-building measures would then give a strong indication of dubious intent. ...

Under certain circumstances it may be possible to go a step further and to agree on confidence-building measures which would put certain constraints on the respective military options. While leaving the over-all military potential intact, the objective of such constraints ought to be to make sure that the existing potentials cannot be used for aggressive purposes."⁴¹

In a treatment that captures splendidly the practical difficulty in (1) separating arms control and CBMs, and (2) describing what CBMs actually are, Abbott Brayton discusses the role that CBMs can play in reducing East-West tensions. He begins by noting that an arms race will not come to an end merely because one participant ceases to compete. This is what makes arms races so potentially dangerous. Brayton observes, however, that an arms race:

"can be slowed, perhaps reversed, by altering the perceptions of both sides. CBMs provide the first convincing means of establishing some degree of trust sufficient to induce a climate for arms reduction negotiations, by illuminating presumably peaceful behaviour patterns of either side. CBMs provide reassurance of good intentions through (a) continuous public demonstra-



⁴⁰ Istvan Farago, "Confidence-Building in the Age of Nuclear Overkill," in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds.) *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, pp. 32-33.

⁴¹ *Comprehensive Study of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence Building Measures*, United Nations Document A/36/474, pp. 11-13.

